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CORPORATE OPPORTUNITIES AND
THE THIRD PARTY “REFUSAL TO DEAL”
DEFENSE: POLICY AND PRACTICE
LESSONS FROM ILLINOIS
WILLIAM LYNCH SCHALLER*
“[I]f a trustee, on the refusal to renew, might have a lease for
himself, few estates would be renewed to cestui que use.”1

I.

INTRODUCTION

As Adam Smith recognized as long ago as 1776 in The Wealth
of Nations, the division of labor to achieve specialization plays a
key role in advancing both business enterprises and civilization
itself.2 All firms appreciate this reality and divide tasks
accordingly, from senior management on down. So long as
employees and agents of the firm remain loyal, this system works
reasonably well and profitably, at least when compared to the
alternative of a person going it alone.3 But agents placing their

* Partner, Baker & McKenzie, Chicago, Illinois. As always, this article is
dedicated with love to my wife, Jane Reynolds Schaller, and my children,
Alexandra, William, George and Samantha Schaller. A special thanks to my
partners and pals, John M. Murphy and Peter P. Tomczak, great fiduciary
duty lawyers and even greater friends.
Despite their comments and
criticisms, all errors are mine alone.
1. Keech v. Sandford, 25 Eng. Rep. 223 (1726) (quoted in 1 GEORGE E.
PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 2.11, at 146 n.18).
2. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 12 (Edwin Cannan Ed. 1994) (“It is the great
multiplication of the productions of all the different arts, in consequence of the
division of labour, which occasions, in a well-governed society, that universal
opulence which extends itself to the lowest ranks of the people.”). This
continual subdivision into narrower and narrower sub-specialties has
prompted the medical school joke “that young physicians who want to be on
the cutting edge of medicine today should try to learn more and more about
less and less, until they know everything about nothing. Conversely, doctors
who want to be generalists . . . are doomed to know less and less about more
and more, until they know nothing about everything.” THOMAS H. LEE AND
JAMES J. MONGAN, CHAOS AND ORGANIZATION IN HEALTH CARE 11-12 (2009).
3. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (Nov.
1937) (arguing that firms arise because their efficiencies result in lower
transaction costs than strangers dealing at arm’s length); Thomas F.
McInerney, Implications of High Performance Production and Work Practices
for Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
1
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interests ahead of the firm can strain this system, and it can
implode under the weight of the ultimate agency cost – secret
competition by employees and other agents during the agency
relationship.4 Smith himself recognized this danger: “The directors
of [joint stock] companies . . . being the managers rather of other
people’s money than their own, it cannot well be expected, that
they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with
which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over
their own.”5 The English decision in Keech, quoted above,
recognized the same danger fifty years before Smith, as did Roman
law long before Keech.6
The “refusal to renew” ruling in Keech represented much
more than just the familiar biblical truth that “no man can serve
two masters,”7 however. Keech subtly extended this fundamental
principle by recognizing that fiduciary transactions with third
parties lose none of their suspiciousness simply because they are
preceded by a third party’s “refusal to renew” the same transaction
with the fiduciary’s principal.8 As such, Keech offered a profound
policy pronouncement of enduring significance to modern business
law: a third party’s “refusal to deal” should not be a defense to
corporate opportunity usurpation.
The problems with the refusal to deal defense are manifold.
This simple but deceptive defense – that the diverted third-party
trading partner would have refused to deal with plaintiff,
independent of the fiduciary’s wrongdoing – introduces complex
and irrelevant legal arguments under the rubrics of duty,
proximate cause, and remedy.9 The refusal to deal defense also
135, 136 (2004) (arguing that the team production model of corporate
governance explains the theory of the firm better than agency theory and
transaction cost economics).
4. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and
Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 277-81 (1986) (arguing for an ex ante
contract response to agency costs within small firms); Richard A. Epstein, In
Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 959-62 (1984)
(discussing the threat agency costs pose to the firm).
5. Smith, supra note 2, at 800. See also LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER
PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT (1914) (borrowing its title
from Adam Smith’s famous observation).
6. Epstein, supra note 4, at 960, n.22 (arguing that Gaius’ Institutes
recognized misappropriation of partnership opportunities as wrongful in
Roman times); STEVEN G. MEDEMA, THE HESITANT HAND: TAMING SELFINTEREST IN THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC IDEAS 5-25 (2009) (describing the
history of economic thought on self-interest from ancient Greece through
Adam Smith).
7. See, e.g., Dickson v. People ex rel. Brown, 17 Ill. 191, 193 (1855)
(quoting Matthew, Ch. 6, Verse 24).
8. Unsurprisingly, Keech is considered one of the foundational cases of the
fiduciary duty of loyalty. See Leonard I. Rotman, Fiduciary Law’s “Holy
Grail”: Reconciling Theory and Practice in Fiduciary Jurisprudence, 91 B.U. L.
REV. 921, 922, 942-45 (2011) (discussing the importance of Keech).
9. See notes 41-159 and accompanying text, infra.
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subtly shifts control over corporate opportunity litigation from the
plaintiff-principal to the disloyal defendant. Indeed, it opens the
door for the guilty fiduciary to seek summary judgment based
upon the third party’s “undisputed” and entirely predictable “no
harm, no foul” / “never would have worked with plaintiff anyway”
testimony, thereby leaving the fiduciary and third party free to
work together happily ever after.10 But worst of all, the refusal to
deal defense invites fraud by incentivizing fiduciaries and third
parties to engage in prohibited transactions and then tempting
them to fabricate testimony as a defense, since the defendantfiduciary and the third party are invariably financially aligned, if
not legally married, by the time of litigation and often well
before.11
Using Illinois law as a model, this is the third of three articles
that collectively offer the first serious treatment of the third party
refusal to deal defense in corporate opportunity cases. I began in
my first article with a general overview of Illinois fiduciary
principles, remedies, and proof burdens to show that they have a
different focus than other laws: deterrence is their object, not
simply compensation.12 I then examined the Illinois Supreme
Court’s choice of the “line of business” test over other corporate
opportunity standards, starting with Kerrigan v. Unity Savings
10. Complete Conference Coordinators, Inc. v. Kumon North America,
Inc., 394 Ill. App. 3d 105, 915 N.E.2d 88 (2d Dist. 2009) (affirming summary
judgment in favor of defendant, on tortious interference claim, based upon
customer’s supposed unwillingness to deal with plaintiff).
11. Victor Brudney & Robert Charles Clark, A New Look at Corporate
Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1001, 1021 (1981) (If “third-party refusals to
deal with the corporation are accepted as tests, the inevitable result will be to
permit the diversion. This is true because courts must resolve the legal issues
on the basis of a set of facts largely within the control of the diverter.”); Eric
Talley, Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the
Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, 108 YALE L.J. 279, 291, n.37 (1998) (noting
courts have rejected third party refusal to deal defenses with “virtual
unanimity, expressing wariness about the verifiability of such alleged
incapacities and the concomitant incentive of the fiduciary to claim that such
barriers existed (when in fact they did not).” (emphasis added)); Matthew R.
Salzwedel, A Contractual Theory of Corporate Opportunity and a Proposed
Statute, 23 PACE L. REV. 83, 115-16 (2002) (collecting third party refusal to
deal cases and proposing a statute that would exclude this defense); Michael
Begert, The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine and Outside Business Interests, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 827, 835-36 (1989) (noting that modern corporate opportunity
cases have generally required fiduciaries to disclose third party refusals to
deal); CHARLES W. MURDOCK, 8 ILLINOIS PRACTICE: BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
§14:12, at 209-10 (2010) (“What is Not a Corporate Opportunity”) (noting third
party refusals to deal as a defense to Illinois corporate opportunity actions);
Philip J. Katauskas, Representing the Non-Party Deponent Who Cares, 34
LITIG 4, 18 (Summer 2008) (most non-party witnesses have an interest in the
litigation in which they are testifying).
12. William Lynch Schaller, Corporate Opportunities and Corporate
Competition in Illinois: A Comparative Discussion of Fiduciary Duties, 46 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 1 (2012).
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Association.13 This choice – though poorly understood and widely
misapplied by the Illinois Appellate Court – has important
consequences: unless a fiduciary can show he disclosed and
tendered the opportunity, he is foreclosed from seizing it under the
prophylactic “line of business” test.14 Since full disclosure and
timely tender almost never occur, the net effect of the Kerrigan
line of business test should be to foreclose the third party refusal
to deal defense as a matter of law.
This simple insight certainly has not been lost on the Illinois
Supreme Court, but it generally has eluded other Illinois courts.
To show this, my second article focused upon the role of third
parties in Illinois corporate opportunity litigation,15 offering a
chronological exploration by court, starting with the Illinois
Supreme Court and then moving to the Illinois Appellate Court,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and finally the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.16 In two
major corporate opportunity decisions shortly after Kerrigan, the
Illinois Supreme Court gave significant relief to victimized
principals, and in both cases there was no proof the third parties
were willing to deal with the principals, and indeed some proof
they were unwilling to deal with the principals.17 Unfortunately,
the court did not specifically offer a “rule” against third party
testimony in these cases, and thus this dimension of its corporate
opportunity jurisprudence has gone largely unnoticed in
subsequent Illinois decisions. As noted, the result of this omission
has been repeated attempts by guilty fiduciaries to escape liability
through irrelevant third party testimony. Some have been
successful and others have not, but all have managed to impose
enormous cost, delay, and uncertainty on their opponents via this
third party “defense.”

13. 58 Ill. 2d 20, 517 N.E.2d 30 (1974).
14. Id. at 28, 517 N.E.2d at 43-44.
15. William Lynch Schaller, The Origin and Evolution of the Third Party
“Refusal to Deal” Defense in Illinois Corporate Opportunity Cases, 46 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 937 (2013).
16. In each instance, I worked through the particular court’s decisions
chronologically, as this approach approximated the way the court itself
experienced and contributed to doctrinal direction. Cf. Randy E. Barnett,
Three Federalisms, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 285, 285-86 (2008) (“One reason we do
not distinguish each of these versions [of federalism] from the others is that
we teach Constitutional Law by doctrine or topic rather than chronologically
by era. When taught chronologically, these different versions of federalism
fairly leap off the page.”).
17. Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 58 Ill. 2d 289, 321 N.E.2d 1 (1974) (upholding $7.2
million judgment and massive salary forfeiture against fiduciary, despite
absence of evidence that third party would have dealt with plaintiff);
Mullaney, Wells & Co. v. Savage, 78 Ill. 2d 534, 402 N.E.2d 574 (1980)
(upholding $800,000 constructive trust award against fiduciary, despite
absence of evidence that third party would have dealt with plaintiff, and
despite some evidence that third party would not have dealt with plaintiff).
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In the present article, the third and last of the three, I
examine the practice implications of eliminating the third party
refusal to deal defense in Illinois corporate opportunity cases.
While I think it should be obvious that a third party’s refusal to
deal is not a defense to liability under the categorical “line of
business” test in Illinois, I maintain that it is also not a defense to
proximate cause or any form of relief, whether the remedy is
damages for plaintiff’s loss, disgorgement of defendant’s gain, a
constructive trust requiring conveyance of property, an injunction
prohibiting usurpation, or compensation forfeiture for disloyalty.
Indeed, in my view, third parties should be defendants themselves
in most of these cases, subject to secondary liability for
encouraging the fiduciary’s misconduct if they knew the
defendant-fiduciary was in an agency relationship with the
plaintiff-principal in connection with the transaction in issue.
From a practice perspective, then, eliminating the third party
refusal to deal would go a long way toward guaranteeing summary
dispositions against all relevant wrongdoers in corporate
opportunity cases. In my view, this would promote the deterrence
rationale of Illinois corporate opportunity law far better than
after-the-fact attempts to determine the motives of self-interested
and potentially liable third parties.
In light of these serious shortcomings, I conclude that the
third party refusal to deal defense should be explicitly eliminated
in Illinois corporate opportunity cases as a matter of policy. It is
not asking too much to require fiduciaries to disclose and tender
corporate opportunities so that their principal’s consent is clear at
the outset. This comports with everyone’s legitimate expectations
and allows the market to take its orderly course with respect to
the opportunity. Deterrence of fiduciary disloyalty is the primary
function of the corporate opportunity doctrine in Illinois, not
simply compensation of victims, and thus to ask whether plaintiff
has “lost” something – as the third party refusal to deal defense
does – is to ask the wrong question.
II. DUTY, BREACH, PROXIMATE CAUSE, AND REMEDY:
DOES THE THIRD PARTY REFUSAL TO DEAL DEFENSE
HAVE A ROLE?
In canvassing Illinois corporate opportunity cases, I found no
Illinois Supreme Court or Illinois Appellate Court decision that
assigned a specific legal role to the third party refusal to deal
defense using the traditional taxonomy of duty, breach of duty,
proximate cause, or remedy. The Illinois Supreme Court has
simply ignored third party refusals to deal as irrelevant under
Kerrigan and its progeny, Vendo Co. v. Stoner18 and Mullaney,

18. 58 Ill. 2d 289, 321 N.E.2d 1 (1974).
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Wells & Co. v. Savage.19 The Illinois Appellate Court, on the other
hand, has generally treated this defense as a question of fact
without assigning it to a particular legal slot. Illinois federal
courts have largely followed the Illinois Appellate Court’s path,
although Durasys, Inc. v. Lebya20 invoked the City of Chicago’s
refusal to deal as a remedy defense on both damages and
injunctive relief, albeit inconsistently.
In this section, I dissect the different roles the third party
refusal to deal defense could be argued to play. I find its
elimination easily accomplished within established Illinois law,
with only discrete remedy issues presenting difficulties. For ease
of analysis, I organize my comments below in tort terms, focusing
on duty, breach of duty, proximate cause, and remedy. While this
is a familiar model, a word of caution is in order: breach of
fiduciary duty is not a “tort” in Illinois, and deploying tort labels
tends to mask the distinct policies and remedies of Illinois
fiduciary duty law in general and Illinois corporate opportunity
law in particular. With these concerns in mind, I start with the
tort-equity dichotomy.
A. Fiduciaries
1. Tort or Equity?
As noted, the tort formulation of “duty/breach/proximate
cause/damages” is not the proper conceptual framework for
corporate opportunity cases in Illinois. Illinois is one of the few
states that views fiduciary duty claims as falling outside of the tort
realm.21
The appropriate starting point is Kinzer v. City of Chicago.22
In that case, City of Chicago officials funded the summer
entertainment festival then known as “Chicago Fest” (now known
as “Taste of Chicago”) without a prior appropriation by the City
Council. A taxpayer, Kinzer, sued one of the government officials,
Grimm, for breach of fiduciary duty based upon this apparent
violation of the Illinois Municipal Code, and Grimm defended in
19. 78 Ill. 2d 534, 402 N.E.2d 574 (1980).
20. Durasys, Inc. v. Lebya, 992 F.2d 1465 (7th Cir. 1993).
21. See Deborah A. DeMott, Causation in the Fiduciary Realm, 91 B.U. L.
REV. 851, 852, n. 7 (2011) (noting that not all states treat breach of fiduciary
duty as a tort after the fashion of the Restatement of (Second) of Torts and
citing Kinzer as an example). The Illinois Supreme Court’s thoroughly
traditional view in Kinzer seems odd only because law schools gradually
ceased teaching equity as a substantive field after the merger of law and
equity via the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1937. Some
have recognized this singular omission and proposed adding fiduciary law as a
foundational course in law school. See generally Rafael Chodos, Fiduciary
Law: Why Now? Amending the Law School Curriculum, 91 B. U. L. REV. 837
(2011).
22. 128 Ill. 2d 437, 539 N.E.2d 1216 (1989).
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part on the ground of immunity under the Local Governmental
and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act. The Illinois
Supreme Court rejected this defense, holding that breach of
fiduciary duty is not a “tort” under Illinois law. To support this
ruling, the court pointed out that it had not accepted Section 874
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as the basis of fiduciary duty
liability and that it had long “regarded breach of fiduciary duty as
controlled by the substantive laws of agency, contract and
equity.”23
The Illinois Supreme Court reaffirmed this view in Armstrong
v. Guigler,24 a case in which the court held that the five year
“catch-all” statute of limitations, rather than the ten year written
contract statute of limitations, applies to Illinois fiduciary duty
claims. In so holding, the court noted the “unique” nature of
fiduciary duty claims25 and offered the following important
analysis:
By way of contrast, where a party advances a breach of duty that
arises by operation of law, the action is no longer contractual in
nature, but delictual. Stated otherwise, a claim for a breach of a
legal duty, as opposed to a breach of a contractual promise, is in
essence an action ex delicto. The difference between the two
breaches lies, in historical terms, in the distinction between an
action in assumpsit and an action in case. See, e.g., Fidelity Trust
Co. v. Poole, 136 Ill. App. 266, 273 (1907) (“For a breach of the duty
an agent owes to his principal, the action may be in assumpsit for
the breach of the implied promise, or in case for the breach of the
implied duty”).
***
A breach of an implied fiduciary duty is not an action ex contractu
simply because the duty arises by legal implication from the parties’
relationship under a written agreement. In fact, a fiduciary
relationship is founded on the substantive principles of agency,
contract and equity. Because a fiduciary relationship is an
amalgamation of various aspects of legal jurisprudence, a purely
contractual statute of limitations is inapplicable to a breach thereof.
Only the five-year statute of limitations for all civil actions not
otherwise provided for is truly consonant with the distinctive
characteristics of breach of an implied fiduciary duty, regardless of
the fact that the fiducial relationship arose from a written
contract.26

The holdings in Kinzer and Armstrong, although departures
from the Restatement (Second) of Torts, are in fact consistent with
the Restatement (Second) of Agency, which stresses the “sui
generis” nature of agency contracts in its Introductory Note to
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 445, 539 N.E.2d at 1220 (citations omitted).
174 Ill. 2d 281, 673 N.E.2d 290 (1994).
Id. at 294, 673 N.E.2d at 297.
Id. at 291-92, 293-94, 673 N.E.2d at 295-96 (emphasis in original).
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Chapter 13.27 This point is worth noting since Chapter 13, Title C,
subtitled “Duties of Loyalty,” is the home of Sections 387 to 407,
the relevant Restatement (Second) of Agency principles that have
dominated Illinois fiduciary duty case law in the areas of corporate
opportunity and corporate competition claims and remedies. One
need only read Vendo and Mullaney to see this.28 Indeed, Illinois
corporate opportunity decisions have almost all involved agents,
and the predominant relief awarded has been equitable –
constructive trusts, accountings, and injunctions. Thus, Kinzer and
Armstrong are quite consistent with Illinois corporate opportunity
jurisprudence. And this jurisprudence, in turn, is consistent with
the historical divide between law and equity,29 as trusts and
27. The Introductory Note offers the following commentary:
Agency is both a consensual and a fiduciary relation. Normally it is the
result of a contract between the parties. Where this is true, the agent’s
duties include the performance of any contractual obligations; failure to
perform these, if without excuse, is a breach of contract. Thus, in
determining the existence and extent of the agent’s duties to the
principal, the normal rules of contractual obligations come into play
with reference to the requirements of mutual manifestations, of
consideration, the effect of a breach by one party or the other, of fraud or
duress, of illegality of the Statute of Frauds, of incapacity, and all the
other rules which make up the subject known as contracts.
However, although the agency relation normally involves a contract
between the parties, it is a special kind of contract, since an agent is not
merely a promisor or a promisee but is also a fiduciary. Because he is a
fiduciary and is subject to the directions of the principal, the rules as to
his duties to the principal are unique. Substituting for the terms of the
trust the will of his principal, his fiduciary duties are similar to those of
a testamentary trustee to the beneficiaries. Further, since the contract
of employment, if there is one, is ordinarily not spelled out in detail but
depends for its interpretation upon evidence as to the customary way of
doing business, the generalizations which can be drawn concerning the
agent’s duties are inferences of fact which are permissible only in the
absence of a specific understanding otherwise. In the absence of fraud,
duress or illegality, any agreement between the parties will be enforced,
at least to the extent of granting a cause of action for its breach. Even
specific agreements, however, must be interpreted in the light of the
principles which are applicable to the relation of principal and agent.
The existence of the fiduciary relation between the parties, and the duty
of the agent not to act for the principal contrary to orders, modify all
agency agreements and create rules which are sui generis and which do
not apply to contracts in which one party is not an agent for the other.
28. See Vendo, 58 Ill. 2d at 305, 321 N.E.2d at 10 (citing Restatement
(Second) of Agency §§ 387, 389, 391, 393 and 394); Mullaney, 78 Ill. 2d at 54647, 402 N.E.2d at 580 (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 387, 393).
29. See S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW
74-87 (1969) (describing the rise of equity as a system separate from and at
times superior to common law); James Oldham, A Profusion of Chancery
Reform, 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 609, 609 (2004) (“That a right in itself purely
legal cannot be the proper subject of discussion in a jurisdiction purely
equitable, and that a right purely equitable, cannot be the proper subject of a
purely legal jurisdiction, are axioms that cannot be denied.” (quoting 1 J.J.
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fiduciary duties have long been the principal concerns of equity
courts.30 Ironically, Prodromos v. Everen Securities, Inc.,31 which I
have criticized considerably on other grounds, reflects perhaps the
most salient feature of this history – the absence of jury trial
rights for fiduciary duty claims, which were equity actions
unknown at common law.32
On the other hand, when fiduciaries commit true torts,
Illinois Supreme Court decisions depart from Kinzer and
Armstrong. Two decisions in particular come to mind: Neade v.
Portes33 and Martin v. Heinold Commodities, Inc.34 In Neade, the
problem was failure to disclose physician incentives in the context
of a wrongful death allegedly resulting from medical malpractice.
The trial court found that the defendant physician’s financial
motive was not relevant to whether he violated the applicable
standard of care in treating the decedent. The Illinois Supreme
Court acknowledged that the physician-patient relationship is a
fiduciary one but dismissed the fiduciary duty claim as duplicative
of plaintiff’s negligence claim. The supreme court in Neade
distinguished other fiduciary duty cases, including the corporate
opportunity decision in Levy v. Markal Sales Corp.,35 on the
ground that Levy and these other cases did not involve plaintiffs
bringing causes of action sounding in both breach of fiduciary duty
POWELL, ESSAY UPON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS viii (1790));
JAMES OLDHAM, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE AGE OF MANSFIELD 103 (2004)
(alluding to the distinct administration of law and equity); JAMES R. STONER,
JR., COMMON LAW LIBERTY: RETHINKING AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 11
(2003) (discussing enforcement of common law in the Court of Common Pleas
and King’s Bench and throughout the realm in local courts, as opposed to the
administration of equity in the Court of Chancery and adherence to civil law
principles in ecclesiastic and admiralty courts).
30. Cigna Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1879 (2011) (“Trusts are, and
always have been, the bailiwick of the courts of equity”) (quoting 4 A. SCOTT
W. FRATCHER, & M. ASCHER, TRUSTS § 24.1, 1654 (5th ed. 2007)); Janowiak v.
Tiesi, 402 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1009, 932 N.E.2d 569, 582 (1st Dist. 2010) (“Thus,
it can be said that a trustee is held to an even more intense duty of loyalty
than in any other fiduciary relationship. We find no support for the assertion
that a trustee would not be subject to the same, if not more intense, duties of
loyalty and disclosure of information as other fiduciaries.”); 1 DAN B. DOBBS,
LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 2.3(1), at 64 (2d ed.
1993) (“Likewise the modern law of fiduciary and confidential relationships, of
supreme importance in a wide range of contemporary decisions, is a product of
equity’s role in the law of trusts”); PALMER, supra note 1, Vol. 1, §1.1, at 1-2
(“It has been traditional to regard tort and contract as the two principal
sources of civil liability at common law, although liability arising out of a
fiduciary relationship has developed largely outside these two great
categories”).
31. 389 Ill. App. 3d 157, 906 N.E.2d 599 (1st Dist. 2009).
32. Id. at 157, 906 N.E.2d at 599 (collecting fiduciary duty cases rejecting
jury trial rights).
33. 193 Ill. 2d 433, 739 N.E.2d 496 (2000).
34. 163 Ill. 2d 33, 643 N.E.2d 734 (1994).
35. 268 Ill. App. 3d 355, 643 N.E.2d 1206 (1st Dist. 1994).
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and negligence. “Thus,” the Neade court held, “the courts in the
cited cases [including Levy] did not determine whether the
plaintiffs’ injuries were sufficiently addressed by traditional
negligence claims.”36 Neade, then, was little more than a standard
tort negligence case masquerading as a fiduciary duty claim.37
Martin presented more sophisticated problems than Neade.
Martin was cited in Neade as requiring plaintiff to allege “that a
fiduciary duty exists, that the fiduciary duty was breached, and
that such breach proximately caused the injury of which the
plaintiff complains,”38 and Martin does indeed contain language
loosely capturing this traditional tort formulation in the context of
the investment loss causation issue that arose under the
fraudulent misrepresentation claim there – a traditional tort.39
The investment loss question, however, was accompanied by a
separate issue over wrongful gains derived from fake foreign
service fees the defendant charged plaintiffs in connection with
their investments. This wrongful gains issue, which triggered
constructive trust relief, presented a Kinzer-type fiduciary duty
claim of the “agency-contract-equity” variety. The court did not
impose a “proximate cause” requirement as a condition for
recovering the fake fees under a fiduciary duty unjust enrichment
theory. Thus, Martin actually involved both a true tort claim and a
true fiduciary duty claim, with each yielding different results from
a conceptual and remedial standpoint. Unfortunately, the Martin
court did not explicitly distinguish between the fake fee and
investment loss claims for proximate cause purposes, nor did the
court discuss or even cite its earlier decision in Kinzer. Adding to
the confusion, the Illinois Supreme Court failed to note Martin in
its statute of limitations opinion in Armstrong, which was decided
just a few months after Martin.
Properly understood, then, Neade and Martin just stand for
the unremarkable proposition that fiduciaries and non-fiduciaries
alike can be guilty of certain torts, like negligence in Neade and
intentional misrepresentation in Martin, and therefore fiduciaries
should be held to the same standards as non-fiduciaries for such
claims.40 It does not follow, though, that every breach of fiduciary
36. Neade, 193 Ill. 2d at 450, 739 N.E.2d at 505.
37. See also Martinez v. Elias, 397 Ill. App. 3d 460, 922 N.E.2d 457 (1st
Dist. 2009) (under Neade, evidence of a physician’s financial incentives may be
relevant to attack his credibility in a negligence claim).
38. Id. at 444, 739 N.E.2d at 502.
39. Doe v. Dilling, 228 Ill. 2d 324, 343, 888 N.E.2d 24, 30 (2008)
(fraudulent misrepresentation has been “historically treated as purely an
economic tort under which one may only recover damages for pecuniary
harm”); Hassan v. Yusuf, 408 Ill. App. 3d 327, 944 N.E.2d 895 (1st Dist. 2011)
(affirming fraudulent misrepresentation finding against fiduciary defendant).
40. E.g., Mueller Industries, Inc. v. Berkman, 399 Ill. App. 3d 456, 471, 927
N.E.2d 794, 809 (2d Dist. 2010) (citing Prodromos and noting that intentional
breach of fiduciary duty is analogous to the tort of fraud for purposes of the
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duty claim gives rise to a “tort” merely because a fiduciary
happens to be involved. Illinois fiduciary duty law is instead
preoccupied with a distinct set of rights and remedies, as the
corporate opportunity, corporate competition, and self-dealing
director cases all demonstrate.
2. Duty
The tort-equity distinction makes its presence felt at the
outset of every corporate opportunity case: determining duty.
Under the tort construct, the duty debate would be framed in
terms of what a reasonable person would do under the
circumstances. This would then open the discovery and
evidentiary floodgates as to expert testimony on obligations, as
occurred in LID Associates v. Dolan.41 But the Illinois Appellate
Court properly rejected the trial court’s expert testimony approach
in Dolan and held that fiduciary duties present questions of law
solely for the court to determine.42
This certainly is the approach the Illinois Supreme Court took
in Kerrigan with respect to corporate opportunities. To repeat,
under Kerrigan, a fiduciary has a duty to disclose and tender an
opportunity within or reasonably incident to the corporation’s line
of business. Disclosure and tender by the fiduciary almost never
occur; at best, the fiduciary points to the principal’s existing
knowledge of the opportunity and the fact that the third party has
made the opportunity available to the principal, as in Patient Care
Services v. Segal.43 Neither is a substitute for informing the
principal that the fiduciary himself is seeking the opportunity, and
neither is a substitute for the fiduciary himself tendering the
opportunity.
“Disclosure” means disclosure by the fiduciary of all material
facts known to the fiduciary, not disclosure by some third party of
facts known to the third party. This includes disclosure by the
fiduciary of the one fact that matters most – the fiduciary’s secret
interest. This was Stoner’s problem in Vendo. When Vendo asked
Stoner about his involvement with third party Phillips, Stoner told
Vendo “the relationship had been confined to loans and that these
had since been paid by another person. Stoner did not disclose that
this other person was [Stoner’s] sister-in-law.”44 This “disclosure,”
the supreme court stressed, “was far from complete.”45 Stoner’s
lack of full disclosure later came home to roost when Vendo
directed Stoner to acquire the Lektro-Vend from third party
Phillips:
crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege).
41. 324 Ill. App. 3d 1047, 756 N.E.2d 866 (1st Dist. 2001).
42. Id. at 1058-60, 756 N.E.2d at 876-77.
43. 32 Ill. App. 3d 1021, 337 N.E.2d 417 (1st Dist. 1975).
44. Vendo, 58 Ill. 2d at 300, 321 N.E.2d at 7.
45. Id.
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Stoner had a foot in each camp. Not only did his undisclosed interest
in controlling the further development and ultimately the
manufacture and sale of the Lektro-Vend create the possibility of his
taking an unfair advantage of plaintiff, but the evidence gives
strong indication that he actually misled plaintiff while he was
purportedly acting as plaintiff’s agent with regard to plaintiff’s
possible acquisition of the Lektro-Vend. The information given
plaintiff that Phillips wanted a price of $1,500,000 for the LektroVend came only from Stoner. Whether Phillips might have been
willing to sell at a lower figure acceptable to plaintiff is unknown.46

There is a second and often-overlooked point to be considered
here: “disclosure” is not “tender.” The definition of tender is “to
present formally for acceptance,”47 which is precisely the sense in
which the Kerrigan court used the term – a per se requirement.48
The Kerrigan court imposed the “tender” obligation on fiduciaries
for a “prophylactic” reason: to make it incumbent on fiduciaries to
ascertain from the principal itself – not from some third party –
what the principal has decided to do, including the principal’s
formal acceptance or rejection of the tendered opportunity. Until
the principal formally advises the fiduciary that it has decided to
decline the tendered opportunity, the fiduciary acts at his peril in
pursuing the opportunity for himself, as the fiduciaries learned in
Kerrigan and Anest v. Audino.49 Had the appellate court in Patient
Care Services simply invoked the meaning of “tender,” its
reasoning would have been far simpler: Segal disclosed but
certainly did not “tender” the hospital contract opportunity to
Patient Care Services when he embarked upon his open pursuit of
it for himself.
The implications of the tender condition are crucial. The fact
that a third party has made the opportunity available to the
principal and the third party has rejected the principal, does not

46. Id. at 304, 321 N.E.2d at 9-10.
47. See http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/tender.
48. Cf. Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 157-58 (1996)
(rejecting per se formal tender requirement under Delaware corporate
opportunity test that differs substantially from the Illinois “line of business”
test); Richard A. Epstein, Contract and Trust in Corporate Law: The Case of
Corporate Opportunity, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 5 (1996) (discussing corporate
opportunity law against the backdrop of the difficult facts presented in Broz).
49. 332 Ill. App. 3d 468, 773 N.E.2d 202 (2d Dist. 2002). See CHARLES W.
MURDOCK, 8 ILLINOIS PRACTICE: BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §14.13, at 212-15
(2010) (“The Importance of Tendering the Opportunity to the Corporation”):
Since the test for the existence of a corporate opportunity is so broad –
an activity “that is reasonably incident to its present or prospective
operations” [quoting Kerrigan] – prudence certainly dictates tendering
any possible transaction that may involve a corporate opportunity to the
corporation. However, when counseling this approach to a client, the
response often is “what if the corporation might want it?” Such a
response answers the basic question: if the director hesitates to tender
the opportunity, it very likely is an opportunity.
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give the fiduciary a green light to begin bidding on his own, as the
courts rightly held in Patient Care Services,50 Comedy Cottage v.
Berk,51 Lindenhurst Drugs v. Becker,52 Regal-Beloit Corp. v.
Drecoll,53 and Foodcomm International v. Barry.54 A fiduciary
must tender because it is up to the principal – and the principal
alone – to decide how to proceed; this will often include the
principal’s attempt to persuade the third party to change its mind,
as in Patient Care Services, Comedy Cottage, Lindenhurst Drugs,
Levy, Regal-Beloit, Foodcomm and LCOR v. Murray.55 The
“tender” and “disclosure” requirements of Kerrigan and Vendo
thus complement one another and are reinforced by Mullaney,
where the Illinois Supreme Court held that a fiduciary cannot
“begin to act on his own” without his principal’s consent.56
Clearly, then, a third party’s real or imagined refusal to deal
with the principal does not somehow allow a fiduciary to stand
silent under Kerrigan, let alone to begin secretly competing. The
usual role of the third party refusal to deal defense – eliminating
any “interest or expectancy” on the principal’s part and thereby
discharging any duty on the fiduciary’s part – simply has no place
in the duty analysis under modern Illinois corporate opportunity
law.
3. Breach of Duty
If a third party’s refusal to deal does not trump a fiduciary’s
disclosure and tender duties under Kerrigan, a breach of fiduciary
duty should be a given when the opportunity falls within the
principal’s “line of business.” A third party’s actions or inactions do
not somehow negate a fiduciary’s failure to meet his Kerrigan
obligations57 – neither does the principal’s independent discovery
and pursuit of the opportunity. The principal is always entitled to
the fiduciary’s full disclosure and tender so that the principal
remains in control of the opportunity vis-à-vis its fiduciary.
So understood, in most cases a liability finding for breach
should be a summary determination. Finding a breach summarily
is important independent of whether the principal has suffered a
loss or the fiduciary has obtained a gain. Even if no gain or loss
has occurred, a fiduciary breach may trigger forfeiture of the
50. 32 Ill. App. 3d 1047, 756 N.E.2d 866 (1st Dist. 2001).
51. 145 Ill. App. 3d 355, 495 N.E.2d 1006 (1st Dist. 1986).
52. 154 Ill. App. 3d 61, 506 N.E.2d 645 (2d Dist. 1987).
53. 955 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
54. 328 F.3d 300 (7th Cir. 2003).
55. 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3373 (N.D. Ill. March 19, 1997).
56. Mullaney, Wells & Co., 78 Ill. 2d at 549, 402 N.E.2d at 581.
57. Cf. Prodromos v. Everen Securities, Inc., 341 Ill. App. 3d 718, 725-26,
793 N.E.2d 151, 157 (1st Dist. 2003) (rejecting agent’s argument that his
fiduciary duties in connection with assisting plaintiff to buy a bank were
negated by plaintiff’s alleged duty to inform defendant of vital facts regarding
plaintiff’s fitness to run a bank).
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fiduciary’s compensation for the period of disloyalty, depending
upon the severity of the disloyalty. Moreover, if the fiduciary has
actually seized an opportunity, constructive trust relief should
follow automatically from a finding of breach, as should an
accounting order and a prejudgment interest award with respect
to the fiduciary’s profits earned prior to the property being turned
over to the principal.
4. Proximate Cause
At first blush, proximate cause appears to be a natural fit for
the third party refusal to deal defense. If the third party would not
have dealt with the principal regardless of the fiduciary’s
wrongdoing, then a “no proximate cause” defense would seem to
arise under a “no harm, no foul” rationale.58 This seems especially
true when the third party claims its refusal to deal with the
plaintiff-principal was and remains “unalterable,” as the third
parties asserted in Peterson Welding Supply Co. v. Cryogas
Products, Inc.,59 Regal-Beloit, and Foodcomm. The superficial
appeal of these arguments breaks down once they are
deconstructed, however.
The third party “refusal to deal” proximate cause defense
implicitly assumes loss of the ultimate deal with the third party,
rather than loss of the opportunity to pursue the deal unfettered
by the fiduciary, is the object of the Kerrigan regime. But Kerrigan
plainly was concerned with the loss of opportunity alone, as the
Illinois Supreme Court emphasized in Kerrigan itself:
If the doctrine of business opportunity is to possess any vitality, the
corporation or association must be given the opportunity to decide,
upon full disclosure of the pertinent facts, whether it wishes to enter
into a business that is reasonably incident to its present or
prospective operations. If directors fail to make such a disclosure
and to tender the opportunity, the prophylactic purpose of the rule
imposing a fiduciary obligation requires that the directors be
foreclosed from exploiting that opportunity on their own behalf.60

Indeed, the supreme court in Kerrigan specifically reversed
the appellate court’s order remanding the case for a determination
as to whether Unity could “in fact” engage in the business of
insurance.61 The high court held that no trial was required on this

58. That is, a “sole proximate cause” defense under Illinois tort law. See,
e.g., Ready v. United/Goedecke Serv., Inc., 238 Ill. 2d 582, 939 N.E.2d 417
(2010) (analyzing “sole proximate cause” defense under Illinois tort law).
59. 126 Ill. App. 3d 759, 467 N.E.2d 1068 (1st Dist. 1984).
60. Kerrigan, 58 Ill. 2d at 28, 317 N.E.2d at 43-44.
61. Kerrigan, 58 Ill. 2d at 31, 317 N.E.2d at 45. In particular, after
determining that Unity always had the legal ability to organize or invest in
either a subsidiary or a service corporation to provide insurance agency
services to its borrowers, the appellate court remanded for a trial over whether
Unity could “in fact” (as opposed to “in law”) engage in the business of selling

2013]

Policy and Practice Lessons From Illinois

15

issue “in the view we take of this case”62 – namely, the directors
were foreclosed from contesting Unity’s ability to capitalize on the
opportunity because of their failure to disclose and tender it to
Unity. Thus, under the express holding of Kerrigan, plaintiff does
not have to prove it would “in fact” have landed the deal with the
third party but for the fiduciary’s wrongdoing.
The Illinois Supreme Court took exactly the same approach in
Vendo, holding that third party Phillips’ willingness to deal with
Vendo was irrelevant due to Stoner’s failure to disclose his conflict
before serving as Vendo’s intermediary with Phillips. In
particular, after emphasizing Stoner’s conflict of interest and
failure to make complete disclosure to Vendo, the court observed:
The information given plaintiff that Phillips wanted a price of
$1,500,000 for the Lektro-Vend came only from Stoner. Whether
Phillips might have been willing to sell at a lower figure acceptable
to plaintiff is unknown.
We recently had occasion in Kerrigan [citation omitted] to consider
the obligation upon a director or officer to make full disclosure to his
corporation. In that case, involving the appropriation of a business
opportunity, the defense was made that the plaintiff, a savings and
loan association, lacked the legal power to engage in the business
which defendants were carrying on, which was the operation of an
insurance agency. We rejected that defense for the reason that the
association had never been given the opportunity to decide that
question for itself.63

This passage from Vendo is conclusive on any argument that
a third party’s refusal to deal constitutes a proximate cause
defense. Vendo did not have to prove third party Phillips’
willingness to deal with Vendo because Vendo had never been
given the opportunity to negotiate with Phillips free from Stoner’s
conflict. The Kerrigan rule thus foreclosed Stoner from arguing
Phillips’ unwillingness to deal as a defense.
Casting a third party’s refusal to deal as a proximate cause
defense also cannot be reconciled with the evidence and outcomes
in Kerrigan, Vendo, and Mullaney. There was no evidence the
third party borrower-customers were willing to deal with Unity
Savings for insurance purposes; there was no evidence third party
Phillips was willing to deal with Vendo, and some evidence he was
unwilling to deal with Vendo; and there was no evidence third
party Blossman was willing to deal with Mullaney, Wells & Co.,
and some evidence he had no desire to deal with Mullaney, Wells
& Co. (at least in the end, when Blossman sought to escape the
lucrative Savage option altogether). Yet, in all three cases, the

fire and casualty insurance. Kerrigan v. Unity Savings Assoc., 11 Ill. App. 3d
766, 773, 297 N.E.2d 699, 704 (1st Dist. 1973).
62. Kerrigan, 58 Ill. 2d at 31-32, 317 N.E.2d at 45.
63. Vendo, 58 Ill. 2d at 304-05, 321 N.E.2d at 9-10.
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Illinois Supreme Court ordered relief against the fiduciaries
without remanding for fact findings as to whether the third parties
were willing to deal with the plaintiff-principals.
The asset misappropriation test, the alternative liability
standard under Kerrigan, leads even more strongly to the
conclusion that a third party’s refusal does not pose a proximate
cause defense. When a fiduciary uses corporate assets to pursue an
opportunity, he is barred from contesting the corporation’s ability
to take the opportunity, a result which is simply a particular
application of constructive trust tracing principles, as explained in
Graham v. Mimms.64 While Graham itself did not involve a third
party refusal defense, the Graham estoppel rule did come into play
in a third party setting in Anest. The thrust of the defense in Anest
was that third party BLM International required a letter of credit
that Precision Pour could not post without a capital infusion from
fiduciary Anest, and therefore, Precision Pour lacked the financial
capacity to take the BLM International exclusive distributorship
opportunity. The court hinted that Audino might have been able to
find the necessary funds on his own given his past experience in
raising capital,65 but the court cut off this inquiry on remand – and
hence any remand inquiry into third party BLM International’s
willingness to deal with Precision Pour – by holding that Audino
was estopped from arguing “that Precision Pour was financially
incapable of accepting the [BLM International] distributorship
offer.”66
Although the defective decisions in the Prodromos drama
addressed proximate cause in the “usurpation” context, they did so
using the wrong rules for purposes of our inquiry. At bottom, the
appellate court implicitly assumed Prodromos had to prove he
would have won the Home Bank deal in order to recover. This view
is plainly contrary to Kerrigan, Vendo, and Mullaney, as
demonstrated above. Under these controlling Illinois Supreme
Court “usurpation” authorities, it was irrelevant that “there was
no evidence ‘whatsoever’ that Home [Bank] would have accepted
plaintiff’s offer” and that “there was no evidence Home [Bank]
would still have been on the market in 12 to 18 months.”67 It was
loss of the opportunity, not loss of the deal, that Prodromos had to
prove, as Prodromos properly argued, albeit under Kirkruff v.
Wisegarver68 rather than Kerrigan, Vendo, and Mullaney. And
there was no denying the opportunity: Home Bank was willing, if
not eager, to deal, as reflected in its quick marriage to State
Financial after a courtship of only three months.
The “loss of opportunity, not loss of deal” distinction also was
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

111 Ill. App. 3d 751, 444 N.E.2d 549 (1st Dist. 1982).
Anest, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 473, 773 N.E.2d at 207.
Id. at 478, 773 N.E.2d at 211.
Prodromos, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 169, 906 N.E.2d at 609.
297 Ill. App. 3d 826, N.E.2d 406 (4th Dist. 1998).
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not addressed in Martin v. Heinold Commodities, Inc.,69 the
opinion Prodromos I and Prodromos II relied upon for their “no
proximate cause” holdings. As noted, for proximate cause
purposes,
Martin
was
a
straightforward
fraudulent
misrepresentation tort case against a fiduciary, not a corporate
opportunity case. Nevertheless, in attempting to justify its tort
proximate cause analysis, Martin purported to find a proximate
cause holding in Vendo:
[Vendo] involved an employee of plaintiff who violated his contract
and principles of agency by helping fund and launch a company to
compete against his employer. Defendant helped this new company
develop a better machine, which damaged plaintiff’s business. The
issue was damages. Plaintiff argued for its lost profits while
defendants argued for the money their machine made. This court
found the appropriate amount of damages to be plaintiff’s lost
profits because plaintiff had proven that defendants’ actions
actually, or proximately, caused those losses.70

This passage from Martin is simply wrong: the phrase
“proximate cause” nowhere appears in Vendo, nor has the Illinois
Supreme Court imposed any such requirement in its corporate
opportunity decisions. But I do agree with the Martin court that
proximate cause happened to have been proven in Vendo, as
Stoner had “actually, or proximately,” caused Vendo not to have a
fair chance at acquiring the Lektro-Vend from third party Phillips
as a result of Stoner’s lack of full disclosure. The same is true in
all corporate opportunity cases: the principal is impeded by its
fiduciary’s actions or inactions, and the injury suffered by the
principal is thus “the natural and not merely a remote
consequence of the defendant’s act.”71 In this respect, it is helpful
here to recall the prudential purpose of proximate cause, whether
for an award of plaintiff’s losses or defendant’s gains. On this
point, Prodromos I and Prodromos II provide sound guidance:
Proximate cause generally is a fact question [citation omitted], but
may be determined as a matter of law when the facts not only are
undisputed but allow no difference in the judgment of reasonable
men as to the inferences to be drawn therefrom.72

***
Because the consequences of every action stretch forward endlessly
through time and the causes of every action stretch back to the
69. 163 Ill. 2d 33, 643 N.E.2d 734 (1994).
70. Id. at 65, 643 N.E.2d at 749-50.
71. Id. at 58, 643 N.E.2d at 746 (quoting Town of Thornton v. Winterhoff,
406 Ill. 113, 119, 92 N.E.2d 163, 166 (1950)). Cf. United States v. Martinez,
588 F.3d 301, 319 (6th Cir. 2009) (discussing enhanced federal criminal
sentence where crime results in death, with the operative test being whether
death was the natural and probable consequence of the defendant’s criminal
conduct).
72. Prodromos, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 727, 793 N.E.2d at 159.
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dawn of human history, the concept of proximate cause was
designed to limit the liability of the wrongdoer to only those injuries
reasonably related to the wrongdoer’s action. [Citation omitted.]
Therefore, one manner of determining proximate cause is through
the remoteness doctrine or “direct-injury” test, which holds that
there must be “some direct relation between the injury asserted and
the injurious conduct alleged.”73

As these teachings suggest, proximate cause can exist as a
matter of law, and I contend it is conclusively demonstrated in all
cases in which a fiduciary fails to tender and disclose in
compliance with Kerrigan, and certainly in all cases in which a
fiduciary successfully diverts an opportunity to himself. In such
cases there is nothing remote at all about causation; in fact, it
could hardly be more direct and immediate. Insufficient fiduciary
disclosure and tender under the Kerrigan “line of business” test
always cause a principal to lose its “opportunity” to negotiate fully
and fairly with the third party, which is precisely why “proximate
cause” was not even mentioned in Vendo. The same result is even
more obvious under the Kerrigan and Graham “asset
misappropriation” test: the fiduciary is equitably estopped from
denying that the corporation could have seized the opportunity,
thereby mooting any proximate cause defense to the effect that the
third party would have turned down the corporation. Viewed
another way, on either of these incontestable fact patterns,
proximate cause presents a question of law and therefore no trial
is needed,74 as the fiduciary necessarily produces his principal’s
injuries – in the form of loss of opportunity, rather than loss of the
ultimate deal – under the Kerrigan rule.75
A simpler way to understand the irrelevance of proximate
cause, however, is found in the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision
in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor.76 In that case, corporate directors of
Technicolor failed to inform themselves fully concerning all
73. Prodromos, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 171, 906 N.E.2d at 612. See also Flava
Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754, 759 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J.) (“An
injury will sometimes have a cascading effect that no potential injurer could
calculate in deciding how carefully to act. The effect is clear in hindsight – but
only in hindsight.”).
74. Seef v. Ingalls Mem’l Hosp., 311 Ill. App. 3d 7, 19, 724 N.E.2d 115, 124
(1st Dist. 1999) (“Proximate cause ‘is ordinarily a question of fact to be
determined from all the attending circumstances, and it can only be a question
of law when the facts are not only undisputed but are also such that there can
be no difference in the judgment of reasonable men as to the inferences to be
drawn from them’”) (quoting Merlo v. Public Serv. Co., 381 Ill. 300, 318, 45
N.E.2d 665, 675 (1942)).
75. See ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION 15.01 (“When I use the
expression ‘proximate cause,’ I mean a cause that, in the natural or ordinary
course of events, produced the plaintiff’s injury. [It need not be the only cause,
nor the last or nearest cause. It is sufficient if it combines with another cause
resulting in the injury.]”).
76. 634 A.2d 345 (1993).
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material information before approving a merger agreement.77 The
Delaware Court of Chancery found the directors breached their
fiduciary duty of due care, but then denied relief on the ground
that the plaintiff-shareholder “was required to prove it had
suffered a monetary loss from such breach and to quantify that
loss.”78 The Delaware Supreme Court reversed, holding that a tort
action does not control a breach of fiduciary duty claim in
Delaware.79 The Delaware Supreme Court explicitly rejected the
notion that plaintiff in a fiduciary duty action must prove
“resultant injury or loss” – that is, must prove proximate cause
and damages – in order to prevail. Rather, once plaintiff shows
directors failed to use due care, the burden shifts to the accused
directors to show the transaction was entirely fair.80 The court
went on to say that any recoverable loss under the entire fairness
standard was not necessarily limited to the difference between the
price offered and the “true” appraisal value as determined under
appraisal proceedings. Instead, the court emphasized, “the
Chancellor may ‘fashion any form of equitable and monetary relief
as may be appropriate, including rescissory damages.’”81 Thus, as
in Illinois, the fiduciary duty of due care in the corporate
transaction context is not a “tort” at all in Delaware; it is, in fact,
“sui generis,” with its own set of rules and remedies that are
context-specific. Under this non-tort regime, tort-type “proximate
cause” has no role.82
Further support for rejecting a tort “proximate cause”
approach can be found in another Delaware Supreme Court
decision, Thorpe v. CERBCO.83 In Thorpe, George and Robert
Erikson were directors of CERBCO who also owned the controlling
stock interest in that company. INA approached the Eriksons, as
directors of CERBCO, about the possibility of acquiring its

77. Id. at 371.
78. Id. at 358. Specifically, the Court of Chancery ruled that, “as in any
case in which the gist of the claim is negligence, plaintiff bears the burden to
establish that the negligence shown was the proximate cause of some injury to
it and what that injury was.” Id. at 368-69.
79. Id. at 370.
80. Id. at 371.
81. Id. (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983)).
82. Cf. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 644 (2010) (holding that
common law proximate cause is not required to establish a carrier’s liability
under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act; relaxed standard of proximate
cause, focusing on whether employer’s negligence played any part in
employee’s injury, governs FELA proximate cause questions); Nolan v. WeilMcLain, 233 Ill. 2d 416, 910 N.E.2d 549 (2009) (reaffirming the “frequency,
regularity and proximity” test favoring asbestos plaintiffs, but holding that
this test does not create a “presumption” of causation); Sandra F. Sperino,
Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law, and Proximate Cause, 2013 U. Ill.
L. Rev. 1 (2013) (arguing against importing common law tort concept of
proximate cause into statutory discrimination actions).
83. 676 A.2d 436 (Del. 1996).
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subsidiary, CERBCO East. The Eriksons, however, insisted that
INA acquire the Eriksons’ controlling stake in CERBCO instead –
a transaction that was good for them but bad for the holders of
CERBCO East. The Delaware Court of Chancery sided with the
Eriksons on the ground that their controlling stock interest in
CERBCO gave them an absolute right, as shareholders, to veto
any CERBCO East deal. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the Eriksons were guilty of disloyalty because they
were competing against CERBCO East for the affections of INA.84
In other words, under Delaware fiduciary duty law, it didn’t
matter that the proximate cause of the CERBCO East holders’ loss
was the Eriksons’ rightful exercise of their power as controlling
shareholders of CERBCO, a proximate cause view fully supported
by the more recent Delaware law fiduciary duty decisions in CDX
Liquidating Trust v. Venrock Assoc.85 and Kahn v. Kolberg Kravis
Roberts & Co., L.P.86 dispensing with proximate cause in the
ordinary sense. The results in Thorpe, CDX, and Kahn are very
much in line with the Illinois Appellate Court’s decision in Anest,
in which the fiduciary’s corporate control did not excuse his
corporate opportunity usurpation.
Does such an “anti-refusal to deal” rule, preempting tort-style
proximate cause as a matter of policy, square with the philosophy
behind causation and responsibility?87 It certainly does when the
fiduciary induces the third party’s refusal; this is causation in any
sense of the word.88 Yet the same is true even when the third party

84. Id. at 442 (“The fundamental proposition that directors may not
compete with the corporation mandates the finding that the Eriksons
breached the duty of loyalty”).
85. 640 F.3d 209 (7th Cir. 2011) (Posner, J.) (reversing district court’s
“proximate cause” summary judgment ruling in favor of the defense in
Delaware duty of loyalty case).
86. 23 A.3d 831 (Del. 2011) (reversing Court of Chancery’s ruling that
shareholder plaintiff must show harm to the corporation as a condition to
bringing a Delaware duty of loyalty claim against directors).
87. MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN
LAW, MORALS, AND METAPHYSICS (2009) (examining interplay between
causation and responsibility in the contexts of criminal law and tort law);
H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2002) (exhaustive
discussion of causation and responsibility in the contexts of philosophy,
morality, and tort, contract, and criminal law – but offering no discussion of
equity or fiduciary duty law); PETER RABINS, THE WHY OF THINGS: CAUSALITY
IN SCIENCE, MEDICINE, AND LIFE (2013) (discussing multiple models of
causation in philosophy, history, narratives, statistics, physical science,
biological science, social science, religion, medicine, and law); Menno Hulswit,
A
Short
History
of
Causation,
available
at
http://www.library.utoronto.ca/see/SEED/Vol4-3/Hulswit.htm
(reviewing
philosophy of causation espoused by Aristotle, the Stoics, Aquinas, Descartes,
Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Newton, Mill, Hume, and Kant).
88. MOORE, supra note 87, at 84-106 (discussing the legal usage of cause-infact and proximate cause and the problems of over-inclusiveness, underinclusiveness, and counterfactuals).
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approaches the fiduciary individually, whether before or after the
third party asserts its refusal. In both cases, the third party is
obviously interested in an asset of the principal, the fiduciary;
thus, the fiduciary’s attitude and actions plainly make a difference
to the outcome.
In short, a third party’s refusal to deal under the Kerrigan
“line of business” paradigm does not present a tort proximate
cause defense. Treating proximate cause as an essential element of
a corporate opportunity claim, after the fashion of a standard tort,
runs completely counter to the “prophylactic” Kerrigan disclosure
and tender regime, which conclusively presumes the principal
would have prevailed on the opportunity, at least as against the
fiduciary, when an opportunity falls within the corporation’s
present or expected line of business. In addition, “proximate
cause,” in the tort sense of proving actual loss, undercuts the
principal purpose of fiduciary duty law in general and the
corporate opportunity law in particular: deterrence. Thus, there is
a good reason no Illinois corporate opportunity decision had even
mentioned “proximate cause” until Prodromos: tort conceptions of
“proximate cause” fit poorly, if at all, within the deterrence-based
fiduciary duty structure of Illinois corporate opportunity law.89
5. Remedies
A third party’s refusal to deal also should not be a defense to
any form of relief. The question is settled under Mullaney as to
disgorgement and settled under Vendo as to damages and
compensation forfeiture. The question should also be settled as to
injunctive relief, given the total deterrence rationale of Kerrigan,
but cases have yielded conflicting injunction results thus far. More
difficult questions are posed under constructive trust principles, as
it is unclear to what extent a court of equity can re-write a bargain
between a fiduciary and a third party as part of a turnover order
in favor of the principal.
a. Compensation Forfeiture
As noted, the deterrence rationale of fiduciary duty law gives
rise to compensation forfeiture independent of any gain on the
fiduciary’s part or any loss on the principal’s part. Competition for
a corporate opportunity should automatically command
compensation forfeiture, as it did in Vendo. Such conduct is
inherently inimical to the principal’s interests: the fiduciary is, in
fact, seeking to affirmatively defeat the principal through his
competition. This conduct is willful by any measure.
Competition is not a prerequisite to compensation forfeiture,
89. See Deborah A. DeMott, Causation in the Fiduciary Realm, 91 B.U. L.
REV. 851, 854 (2011) (“The nature of a fiduciary’s undertaking of loyal service
should shape how the law assesses causation.”).
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however.90 In Levy, for example, Markal Sales was deprived of the
opportunity to take on representation of Apple, but Markal Sales
itself was not actually seeking the Apple opportunity at the time.
Of course, Markal Sales’ failure to pursue it was due to the fact
that Gust and Bakal controlled Markal Sales and were diverting
the opportunity to themselves through their new entity, G/B Sales.
While one could think of this as competition in a sense, the court
ordered compensation forfeiture because Gust and Bakal were up
to much else besides just diverting the Apple opportunity,
including paying G/B Sales salaries with Markal Sales’ money and
using Markal Sales’ employee time for G/B Sales purposes. And
all of this came on the heels of their termination of Levy as an
employee of Markal Sales, a legitimate act as an abstract matter,
but more likely a prelude to their gutting of Markal Sales (in
which Levy still held an ownership interest) in favor of G/B Sales
(in which Levy had no ownership interest).
Although every corporate competition case should give rise to
compensation forfeiture, not every corporate opportunity case
should do so. In those cases in which a fiduciary had a legitimate
but erroneous reason for believing the opportunity was not within
his principal’s line of business, a court might impose line of
business liability yet find sufficient good faith to deny
compensation forfeiture.91 Kerrigan itself furnishes an example, to
the extent the directors held a good faith but erroneous belief that
Unity as a savings and loan could not engage in insurance agency
work. This view also squares with In re Marriage of Pagano,92 a
post-Vendo case in which the Illinois Supreme Court held that not
every fiduciary breach triggers compensation forfeiture. This
position makes sense when one remembers that Section 456 of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency calls for compensation forfeiture
only for “willful” misconduct on the agent’s part.93 One should also
remember that “compensation” for forfeiture purposes means
compensation the principal paid the fiduciary during the period of
disloyalty; compensation the fiduciary earns from the usurped
opportunity itself – such as fees and profits – are subject to

90. White Gates Skeet Club, Inc. v. Lightfine, 276 Ill. App. 3d 537, 541-42,
658 N.E.2d 864, 868 (2d Dist. 1995) (ordering compensation forfeiture for
defendant’s corporate opportunity usurpation).
91. Cf. Adams v. Lockformer Co., 167 Ill. App. 3d 93, 520 N.E.2d 1177 (1st
Dist. 1988) (rejecting claim that Vendo required compensation forfeiture
where defendants attempted to buy a rival business without telling their
employer, their employer discovered this arguable breach, but then their
employer allowed the fiduciaries to remain as employees for eight months
before firing them for their earlier nondisclosure).
92. 154 Ill. 2d 174, 607 N.E.2d 1242 (1992).
93. See LID Assoc.. 324 Ill. App. 3d at 1071, 756 N.E.2d at 886-87 (willful
and deliberate breach of fiduciary duty requires compensation forfeiture as a
matter of public policy; non-willful conduct does not).
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disgorgement and constructive trust relief, as discussed below.94
There is no “willfulness” qualification as to these amounts for
forfeiture purposes.
b. The Fiduciary’s Gains
Illinois law has long given the victimized plaintiff-principal
the choice of the higher of the fiduciary’s gains or the principal’s
losses,95
a choice also recognized in Section 407 of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency.96 The Illinois Supreme Court has
routinely impressed a constructive trust on benefits a breach of
fiduciary duty has conferred on a fiduciary under this unjust gains
deterrence principle.97 The corporate opportunity context provides
but one example of the application of this rule.
Mullaney directly addressed the “gains” component in
connection with the profit disloyal agent Savage made on the
diverted Blossman stock options. Somewhat simplified, Savage
exercised the Blossman options on March 29, 1961, the day after
he resigned from Mullaney, Wells & Co.98 Mullaney, Wells & Co.
94. E.g., Lightfine, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 541-42, 658 N.E.2d at 868
(impressing a constructive trust on management fees disloyal defendant
earned from diverted property).
95. Williams Electronics Games, Inc. v. Garrity, 366 F.3d 569, 577 (7th
Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.) (extended discussion of gains and losses and the role of
equitable relief in fiduciary wrongdoing cases, while noting that “fiduciary
obligations were an invention of the English chancery court”); Raintree
Homes, Inc. v. Vill. of Long Grove, 209 Ill. 2d 248, 257-58, 807 N.E.2d 439, 445
(2004) (“Damages [differ] from restitution in that damages [are] measured by
the plaintiff’s loss; restitution is measured by the defendant’s unjust gains”
(quoting DOBBS, supra note 30, § 3.1 at 278)); City of Chicago ex rel. Cohen v.
Keane, 64 Ill. 2d 559, 567-69, 357 N.E.2d 452, 457 (1976) (holding that
“monetary damage” to the principal is not a condition to recovery of an agent’s
wrongful gain) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 388, 395, and 404A);
Hill v. Names and Addresses, Inc., 212 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 1084-86, 571 N.E.2d
1085, 1096-98 (1st Dist. 1991) (calculating and then awarding alternative
remedies of counter-defendant’s gains or counter-plaintiff’s losses).
96. Section 407 provides:
(1) If an agent has received a benefit as a result of violating his duty of
loyalty, the principal is entitled to recover from him what he has so
received, its value, or its proceeds, and also the amount of damage
thereby caused; except that, if the violation consists of the wrongful
disposal of the principal’s property, the principal cannot recover its
value and also what the agent received in exchange therefore.
(2) A principal who has recovered damages from a third person because
of an agent’s violation of his duty of loyalty is entitled nevertheless to
obtain from the agent any profit which the agent improperly received as
a result of the transaction.
97. E.g., Martin, 163 Ill. 2d at 55-56, 643 N.E.2d at 745 (quoting
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 160 and comment c, and impressing a
constructive trust on fraudulent “foreign service fees” fiduciary charged its
principals).
98. Savage’s explanation for his sudden resignation and immediate
exercise of the Blossman options was a wonderment: “Had Miller [Savage’s
boss] remained [after confronting Savage about Savage’s apparent disloyalty],
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did not realize until nearly two years later that the options had
been exercised, and it promptly sued at that point. During this two
year intervening period, Savage had transferred the option
proceeds repeatedly through a series of complex transactions, and
ultimately these option proceeds were forfeited as part of a loan
transaction. The appellate court concluded that Mullaney, Wells &
Co. could not trace the option proceeds as a result of these
intervening transactions and therefore denied constructive relief.
The Illinois Supreme Court took a very different view. The
supreme court began by commenting that the “Blossman stock is
significant here because of its value to the plaintiff in 1961,” not
its subsequent value as of 1963.99 The court then held that when
property has been acquired in violation of fiduciary duties, “a
subsequent loss of the property, like a subsequent diminution in
its value, does not reduce the amount to which the plaintiff had
become entitled.”100 The supreme court also rejected the appellate
court’s view that plaintiff’s right to restitution required a tracing
of the trust property into its product: “The plaintiff was entitled to
recover a money judgment for the value of the Blossman stock, and
it was not required to pursue the trust property.”101 Obviously,
third party Blossman’s dislike of both Savage and Mullaney, Wells
& Co. did not change this outcome.
This “gains” holding in Mullaney was consistent with the
earlier decisions in Kerrigan and Vendo. Just as Savage kept and
cashed out the Blossman stock options in Mullaney, it was
undisputed in Kerrigan and Vendo that the guilty fiduciaries
gained on account of their insufficient disclosure and tender: the
directors ended up with the insurance business generated by
Unity Savings’ loans in Kerrigan, and Stoner ended up with the
revolutionary Lektro-Vend machine in Vendo. On any view, these
gains were on account of fiduciary wrongdoing, and therefore
deterrence of fiduciary misconduct and prevention of unjust
enrichment was necessary.102
The third party refusal to deal defense obviously has the least
he would have found out that Savage was terminating his contract for the
reasons that (i) the Blossman option was about to be exercised, Blossman’s
resistance was expected, and Savage had no intention of involving Mullaney,
Wells in a purely personal mater and (ii) Savage would henceforth have to
devote his full attention to his new career adventure.” Supreme Court Brief of
Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant Savage, at 84.
99. Mullaney, Wells & Co., 78 Ill. 2d at 552, 402 N.E.2d at 583.
100. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 161 (1937)).
101. Id. (citing GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 867 (2d ed.
1962)). Accord, People ex rel. Daley v. Warren Motors, Inc., 114 Ill. 2d 305,
317, 500 N.E.2d 22, 27 (1986) (fiduciary must make restitution even if there is
no identifiable res).
102. Cf. Smithberg v. Illinois Mun. Ret. Fund, 192 Ill. 2d 291, 299, 735
N.E.2d 560, 565 (2000) (although some form of wrongdoing is generally
required for the imposition of a constructive trust, wrongdoing is not always a
necessary element, as in the case of a mistake).
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force in the “gains” context.103 To pretend that the third party’s
refusal to deal with the plaintiff-principal somehow absolves the
fiduciary and allows him to keep his wrongful gains would negate
the “prophylactic” purpose of the corporate opportunity doctrine in
Illinois. Such a result would also be directly contrary to the
holdings in Kerrigan, Vendo, and Mullaney.
c.

The Principal’s Losses

Vendo is the leading Illinois case on a principal’s losses
arising from corporate opportunity usurpation.104 As noted, Stoner
served as the intermediary between Vendo and third party
Phillips, and there was no evidence that Phillips was willing to sell
the Lektro-Vend machine to Vendo at a price below $1,500,000.
Despite the absence of any proof of Phillips’ willingness to deal
with Vendo, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the $7.3 million
judgment against Stoner for Vendo’s loss of the Lektro-Vend,
treating proof of Phillips’ willingness to deal as irrelevant.
Faced with this usurpation liability, Stoner tried to argue
that Vendo’s damages for its losses were capped at the amount of
Stoner’s gains, which presumably were little or nothing since the
Stoner/Phillips operation was a start-up. The supreme court
roundly rejected this argument as a matter of policy:

103. As Professor Palmer has observed:
When a fiduciary profits through breach of fiduciary obligation, he will
be held accountable to his principal without regard to whether or not the
profit is at the expense of the principal. The principle is applied most
frequently when the fiduciary violates his duty of loyalty to his
principal, a duty based upon the avoidance of a conflict of interest. The
retention of the benefit is clearly unjust, there is no one else who has a
valid claim, and the only feasible means of preventing the unjust
enrichment is to grant restitution in favor of the principal. The duties of
a fiduciary are among the most important known to the law, it is
indispensable that there be some sanction for their breach, and often the
only effective sanction is restitution in favor of the principal of gains
realized by the fiduciary. Sometimes a breach causes loss to the
principal but frequently it does not, and in these circumstances there is
no satisfactory remedy except restitution.
PALMER, supra note 1, §2.11, at 141 (1978).
104. Levy v. Markal Sales Corp., 268 Ill. App. 3d 355, 643 N.E.2d 1206 (1st
Dist. 1994), in which plaintiff was awarded $500,000 for the value of his stock
in Markal Sales Corporation, is the only other post-Kerrigan Illinois corporate
opportunity case in which damages for loss, rather than disgorgement of the
fiduciary’s monetary gains or some other equitable relief, was awarded.
Henry’s Drive-In, Inc. v. Anderson, 37 Ill. App. 2d 113, 185 N.E.2d 103 (1st
Dist. 1962), also resulted in an award of lost profits, but it preceded Kerrigan
and Vendo and relied upon a “good faith” corporate opportunity test. The
damages award in Grace v. E.J. Kozin Co., 538 F.2d 170, 175 (7th Cir. 1976), a
post-Kerrigan case, was reversed and replaced with the fiduciary’s gains.
Similarly, the “damages” award in Nordhem v. Harry’s Café, Inc., 175 Ill. App.
3d 392, 529 N.E.2d 988 (1st Dist. 1988) was based on the defendants’ actual
net profits – meaning the fiduciaries’ gains – rather than the principal’s losses.
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Plaintiff was not, as defendants urge, limited to the recovery of the
profits which accrued to Lektro-Vend. (See Restatement (Second) of
Agency secs. 399, 401, 407 (1958).) The limitation on a plaintiff’s
recovery proposed by defendants would mean that a fiduciary could
violate his duty without incurring any risk. For if his misconduct
were discovered the most that he could lose would be the profit
gained from his illegal venture; the law would have operated only to
restore him to the same position he would have been in had he
faithfully performed his duties.105

Under the Vendo vision of “losses,” plaintiff is entitled to the
amount plaintiff would have made had plaintiff had the benefit of
the usurped opportunity. Thus, the $7.3 million judgment was
comprised of profits Vendo lost between 1962 and the trial in June
1969, during the period of Stoner’s breach ($2.1 million), and the
diminution in value of Vendo’s business as of June 1969,
attributable to Stoner’s activities ($5.2 million).106
As with the fiduciary’s gains, the third party refusal to deal
defense has nothing to do with the principal’s losses. The
principal’s losses are calculated by comparing its performance and
value with and without the benefit of the opportunity,107 as the
Illinois Supreme Court did in Vendo. This necessarily negates any
role for the third party refusal to deal defense by assuming it
away.108
d. Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief
The corporate opportunity injunction cases have been
inconsistent, perhaps owing to the absence of an Illinois Supreme
Court injunction opinion in the corporate opportunity context.
Some, like Comedy Cottage, reached the right result but struggled
with the third party’s refusal to deal testimony. Others, like RegalBeloit and Durasys, attached great weight to the third party’s
refusal to deal with the plaintiff principal, without recognizing
that their limitations on or complete denials of injunctive relief
were inconsistent with the total deterrence rationale of Kerrigan.
Only LCOR and Foodcomm gave this issue the
straightforward treatment it deserves: the court in each case

105. Vendo, 58 Ill. 2d at 305-06, 321 N.E.2d at 10.
106. Id. at 311-12, 321 N.E.2d at 13.
107. See Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 352 Ill. App. 3d 365, 381, 816
N.E.2d 754, 767-68 (1st Dist. 2004) (rejecting argument that third-party
Allstate’s right to terminate its relationship with plaintiff was a defense to
damages: “[U]ntil terminated, the relationship created by an at-will contract
will presumptively continue in effect so long as the parties are satisfied, and,
therefore, such a relationship is sufficient to support an action for tortious
interference.”).
108. See also id. at 382, 816 N.E.2d at 769 (holding that defendants’ breach
of fiduciary duty and tortious interference “precluded [third-party customer]
Allstate from having a free and unfettered choice regarding keeping its
business with [plaintiff] Dowd.”).
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enjoined the fiduciary outright and left the third party otherwise
free to do as it wished. Indeed, Foodcomm took the principalprotection rule to its logical conclusion by granting injunctive
relief in the face of a third party’s undisputed refusal to deal –
exactly the result that should routinely obtain in all Illinois
corporate opportunity cases. The third party’s interests are
irrelevant in these injunction disputes.109 No one is seeking to
compel the third party to do anything; they are seeking to stop the
fiduciary from gaining by virtue of his wrong – the most basic
public policy of all.110
If the third party’s interests are irrelevant, it follows that
permanent injunctive relief of unlimited duration should be the
norm. A “head start” limitation merely invites the fiduciary and
third party to wait out the injunction, thereby undercutting the
deterrence rationale of Illinois fiduciary duty law.111 A “head start”
restriction also fails to account for the mutually exclusive
outcomes that define true corporate opportunities. If the principal
lands the deal, such as purchasing a building from the third party,
the fiduciary will not be able to make the same purchase a few
months or years later. Finally, market disruption is irrelevant. In
all but the rarest cases, there are plenty of fish in the sea; both the
third party and the market as a whole are barely affected by the
loss of a single participant, and shortages will be met by new
entrants, as the Illinois Supreme Court has recognized in the
analogous context of restrictive covenants.112

109. Grede v. Bank of New York Mellon, 598 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 2010)
(“It is a basic principle that litigants can’t invoke the rights of third parties”).
110. Gunn v. Sobucki, 216 Ill. 2d 602, 618-19, 837 N.E.2d 865, 874 (2005)
(“Few principles of equity are more basic than the doctrine that one seeking
the aid of the courts is prohibited from taking advantage of his own
wrongdoing”).
111. Indeed, courts have had no difficulty in crafting broad preliminary and
permanent injunctions to prevent evasions by wrongdoers. See, e.g., McComb
v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 192 (1949) (a broad injunction is
appropriate where “a proclivity for unlawful conduct has been shown”);
Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1944) (ordering
dissolution of trade association and permanently enjoining corporate
defendants from forming or joining any such trade association for five years to
remedy antitrust violations); Russian Media Grp., LLC v. Cable Am., Inc., 598
F.3d 302, 307 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The district court may even enjoin certain
otherwise lawful conduct when the defendant’s conduct has demonstrated that
prohibiting only unlawful conduct would not effectively protect the plaintiff’s
rights against future encroachment”); ILG Indus., Inc. v. Scott, 49 Ill. 2d 88,
273 N.E.2d 393 (1971) (prohibiting trade secret defendant from producing
certain fans altogether, rather than just prohibiting use of plaintiff’s fan
component part drawings); Burt Dickens & Co. v. Bodi, 144 Ill. App. 3d 875,
494 N.E.2d 817 (1st Dist. 1986) (granting preliminary injunction preventing
trade secret defendant from calling on plaintiff’s customers altogether, rather
than just prohibiting use of plaintiff’s customer list).
112. Canfield v. Spear, 44 Ill. 2d 49, 254 N.E.2d 433 (1969) (rejecting
patient hardship as a ground for voiding restrictive covenant where patients
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Constructive Trust

The most complex questions surround the most common form
of relief – constructive trusts. At one level, constructive trust
awards are as straightforward as disgorgement of a fiduciary’s
gains or injunctive relief blocking a fiduciary from seizing an
opportunity: all three rob the fiduciary of his ill-gotten gains and
thereby discourage such misconduct. But difficulties arise when
the victimized principal is unable or unwilling to stand in the
fiduciary’s shoes due to the deal terms between the fiduciary and
the third party.
Constructive trusts with respect to diverted real estate
interests offer a prime example of the problem in a form that is
easy to rectify. About half of all Illinois corporate opportunity
cases have involved real estate diversions, and in every case the
plaintiff wanted the real estate rather than cash, no doubt because
of the unique nature of the diverted property. To the extent the
property was already sold, the simple solution was for the court to
order the fiduciary to transfer the property to the victim in whole
or in part, with the victim paying its fair share to reimburse the
wrongdoer’s out-of-pocket costs and the wrongdoer accounting to
the victim for any profits. Examples previously covered in this and
my earlier articles include the real estate sales in Bakalis v.
Bressler,113 Paulman v. Kritzer,114 White Gates Skeet Club v.
Lightfine,115 and Mile-O-Mo Fishing Club v. Noble.116 These were
relatively easy cases because the victimized principals apparently
did not complain about the terms struck between their fiduciaries
and the third-party sellers. Presumably the principals found the
sale terms satisfactory and the third-party sellers, having parted
with their interests, lacked standing to complain about the courtordered transfers.
Potentially more complex constructive trusts questions could
have emerged with respect to the lease diversions in Consumers
Co. v. Parker,117 Comedy Cottage, and Lindenhurst Drugs, given
that in each case the third party landlord by definition retained an
ongoing interest in the property and thus faced the prospect of
having a new tenant and new terms forced upon it by the court. In
each case, however, plaintiff was apparently willing to accept the
fiduciary’s lease terms and the landlord apparently was willing to

had reasonable alternatives); Bauer v. Sawyer, 8 Ill. 2d 351, 134 N.E.2d 329
(1956) (same holding); Abbott-Interfast Corp. v. Harkabus, 250 Ill. App. 3d 13,
20, 619 N.E.2d 1337, 1343 (2d Dist. 1993) (“[A] non-compete [agreement]
restriction can be reasonable when there are a large number of other
competitors with which the general public is free to do business.”).
113. 1 Ill. 2d 72, 115 N.E.2d 323 (1953).
114. 38 Ill. 2d 101, 230 N.E.2d 262 (1967).
115. 276 Ill. App. 3d 537, 658 N.E.2d 864 (2d Dist. 1995).
116. 62 Ill. App. 3d 50, 210 N.E.2d 12 (5th Dist. 1965).
117. 227 Ill. App. 552 (2d Dist. 1923).
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accept plaintiff as a substitute tenant. For example, the issue was
averted in Comedy Cottage by the third party landlord’s agreement
to be bound by the judgment in return for plaintiff dropping its
civil conspiracy charge against the landlord.118 The issue was also
averted in Lindenhurst Drugs, as the court awarded a constructive
trust at plaintiff’s request and the landlord was not a party to the
appeal.119
Consumers came closest to wrestling with the question, but it
too skirted the issue in the main. The appellate court reversed the
trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint and “remanded with
instructions to enter a decree in accordance with the prayer of the
bill in this cause,”120 which had requested that the trial court
“direct the assignment and delivery” of the lease to plaintiff by the
fiduciary Parker and his secret partner Mitchell.121 But the
appellate court did not face a substantive conflict between plaintiff
and the third party landlord. The landlord had no previous
objection to plaintiff; only price had divided the landlord and
plaintiff on the lease renewal; and there was no difference in terms
(other than price) between plaintiff’s proposed lease and the
usurped lease of Parker and Mitchell.122 The appellate court
evidently thought the landlord was offering pretexts when the
landlord first professed concern over plaintiff’s previous failure to
use the premises and then asserted that plaintiff had let the
premises “decay to a considerable extent.”123
Assuming the principal is satisfied with the fiduciary’s lease,
but the landlord objects to the principal succeeding to it,
constructive trust law should side with the principal in this
context. The leading treatise on equity contends that, under
constructive trust principles, it is “wholly immaterial” whether
“the landlord would or would not have granted a new lease” to the
principal.124 Constructive trust relief “does not in the slightest
degree depend upon the terms and provisions of the original lease,
118. Comedy Cottage, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 358, 495 N.E.2d at 1010.
119. Lindenhurst Drugs, 154 Ill. App. 3d at 62, 67, 71, 506 N.E.2d at 646,
649, 652 (noting that “other defendants were not parties to this appeal” and
affirming the trial court’s constructive trust in favor of plaintiff upon the
property and any profits the fiduciary derived from the property).
120. Consumers Co., 227 Ill. App. at 572.
121. Id. at 557.
122. Id. at 570 (“It must be kept in mind that the question here to be
determined is to whom does the lease belong? At no time did the [landlord]
make any complaint with reference to the use of the property made by
[plaintiff]; nor did [the landlord] hesitate to offer [plaintiff] a new lease. This
offer was not accompanied by any condition with reference to the future use of
the property, the only difference between the parties throughout the
negotiation being in reference to the amount of rent to be paid.”).
123. Id. at 560.
124. IV JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
AS ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 1050, at 109 (5th Ed.
1941).
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nor upon the attitude of the landlord.”125 Rather, a constructive
trust operates against the fiduciary by treating him as holding
legal title for the benefit of his principal. Thus, “if a condition
inserted in such lease against assigning should prevent the relief
of an actual assignment, it will not in the least prevent the court
from enforcing the trust by compelling the partner to hold legal
title for the benefit of all.”126
But what about the situation in which the fiduciary and third
party strike a bargain that is unattractive or unacceptable to the
principal? Whose interests should trump for constructive trust
purposes – the principal’s, the fiduciary’s or the third party’s? For
example, suppose the principal seeks to lease ten floors in a thirdparty’s building, but its fiduciary sneaks in and rents those floors
for himself plus two more. Should the principal be required to take
all twelve floors, or can the court impose a constructive trust
covering just the ten floors the principal was seeking, leaving the
fiduciary stuck with two floors of his own? Or, as another and
more complex example, suppose the principal offers to buy the
third-party target’s business via an asset purchase without
assuming the liabilities, only to have its fiduciary surreptitiously
buy the third-party target’s business via a stock purchase (which,
in practical effect, assumes the liabilities). Should the principal be
stuck with taking the fiduciary’s stock as its sole constructive trust
remedy, or can the court order the assets held in trust for the
principal with the fiduciary left holding the liabilities? In other
words, does constructive trust law require the principal to take the
fiduciary’s deal, or can the court tailor the constructive trust
remedy to approximate the deal the principal was seeking?
No Illinois corporate opportunity case to date has explored the
limits of constructive trust relief along these lines. Professor Dobbs
argues as a general matter that courts in fashioning equitable
relief should balance the equities and hardships among the
principal, the fiduciary, and the third party.127 In Professor Dobbs’
view, good faith, ethics, fault, and motive should all play roles, as
should hardship to the principal versus hardship to the fiduciary
and third party.128
Assuming these are the proper criteria, the recurring fact
pattern in Illinois has been one of fiduciary deception and bad
faith happily abetted by third parties looking for a better deal than
the victimized principals were offering. Indeed, only in Glasser v.
Essaness Theatre Corp.129 and Northwestern Terra Cotta v.

125. Id.
126. Id. at 108-09.
127. DOBBS, supra note 30 § 2.4(5), at 108-23 (“Balancing Equities,
Hardships and Public Interests”).
128. Id. at 111-12.
129. 414 Ill. 180, 111 N.E.2d 124 (1953).
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Wilson130 did the fiduciaries seriously claim they acted in good
faith, as shown by their “tender” of the opportunities to their
principals, and only in Mile-O-Mo Fishing Club v. Noble131 did the
third party seriously claim it acted in good faith, because the
fiduciary told the third party that he was purchasing the property
for the benefit of his principal.132 These exceptional circumstances
aside, there are no equities to balance with respect to fiduciaries
and third parties in these cases,133 and any “harm” a constructive
trust may inflict upon them is entirely of their own making.134
Thus, the balance of equities and harms should tip decisively in
favor of the plaintiff-principal in most Illinois corporate
opportunity cases, unless the constructive trust would not be
useful to plaintiff135 – a nonstarter, to be sure, when the
opportunity falls within the plaintiff’s line of business.
Professor Bogert offers a more concrete discussion of these
principles in the constructive trust context. He recognizes the
court’s authority to require the plaintiff-principal to reimburse the
guilty fiduciary:
A wronged party seeking the aid of a court of equity in establishing
a constructive trust must himself do equity. The court will exercise
its discretion in deciding what acts are required of the plaintiff as
conditions precedent to the securing of a decree. For example, if the
defendant has obtained title to property of the plaintiff by means of
fraud, the plaintiff will be required to return any consideration
received from the defendant, just as he would if he proceeded on the
theory of rescission. And if the defendant has, during his period of
wrongful retention of the property, expended money for the
preservation or protection of the property, for example, by paying
taxes or the principal or interest on a mortgage, reimbursement may
well be required of the plaintiff. If the defendant has made
improvements or performed services in managing the property,
130. 74 Ill. App. 2d 38, 219 N.E.2d 860 (1st Dist. 1966).
131. 62 Ill. App. 3d 50, 210 N.E.2d 12 (5th Dist. 1965).
132. These cases are discussed in greater detail in my second article, The
Origin and Evolution of the Third Party “Refusal to Deal” Defense in Illinois
Corporate Opportunity Cases, 46 J. Marshall L. Rev. 937, 946-49, 971-75
(2013).
133. See ABC Trans Nat’l Transp., Inc. v. Aeronautics Forwarders, Inc., 62
Ill. App. 3d 671, 682-83, 379 N.E.2d 1228, 1236 (1st Dist. 1978) (holding in
preliminary injunction context that the balance of equities is inapplicable
where the defendant’s “actions were done with full knowledge of the plaintiff’s
rights and with an understanding of the consequences which might ensue”)
(quoting Wilson Concrete Co. v. Cnty. of Sarpy, 189 Neb. 312, 316, 202 N.W.2d
597, 599 (1972)).
134. Id. at 687, 379 N.E.2d at 1239 (“It is hard to see how anyone can claim
immunity for a tort on the ground that it was innocently done, when at the
time of doing it he knew his right to do it was disputed by the person
affected.”) (quoting Welton v. 40 East Oak St. Bldg. Corp., 70 F.2d 377, 381
(7th Cir. 1934)).
135. DOBBS, supra note 30, §2.4(5), at 110 (commenting that “courts should
not impose costs on one party without securing benefits for the other”).
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some courts have been induced to require the plaintiff to
compensate the defendant to the extent that the plaintiff will secure
a benefit from these acts if he secures a constructive trust, especially
in cases where the defendant was not an intentional wrongdoer but
rather acted under mistake or ignorance.

* **
The decree establishing a constructive trust will require the
defendant to deliver possession and convey title to the property and
to pay to the plaintiff profits received or rental value during the
period of wrongful holding, and otherwise to adjust the equities of
the parties after taking an accounting.136

Support for Professor Bogert’s views can be readily found in
Illinois precedent. Illinois examples requiring the plaintiffprincipal to reimburse the defendant-fiduciary as to the purchase
price of usurped property can be found in Bakalis, Paulman,
Lightfine, and Mile-O-Mo Fishing Club, as noted above.137
Lightfine also serves as an example of a case in which
reimbursement of the fiduciary’s incidental expenses in
maintaining the trust property was a condition to constructive
trust relief, although the court on public policy grounds denied the
fiduciary interest on the purchase price payment.138 Graham, in
turn, mentioned in passing the possibility of equitable
compensation in favor of the fiduciary,139 although the proposition
136. GEORGE T. BOGERT, HORNBOOK ON THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 77, at 28889 (6th ed. 1987) (internal footnotes omitted). See also Mattel, Inc. v. MGA
Entertainment, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 911 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that
constructive trust as to all subsequent improvements and profits of
misappropriated Bratz Doll ideas swept too wide: “When the value of the
property held in trust increases significantly because of a defendant’s efforts, a
constructive trust that passes on the profit of the defendant’s labor to the
plaintiff usually goes too far.”); Leigh v. Engle, 858 F.2d 361, 363 (7th Cir.
1988) (trial court properly denied multi-million dollar ERISA claim and
limited recovery to $6,704 where profits were not the result of fiduciary’s
misuse of trust funds); Deborah A. DeMott, Causation in the Fiduciary Realm,
91 B.U. L. Rev. 851, 857-58 (2011) (“Over-determination can compound
quantification problems when the fiduciary’s own efforts legitimately
contributed to the profit.”).
137. Other examples of courts ordering defendants to convey rights upon
receiving reimbursement from plaintiffs are collected in PALMER, supra note 1,
§2.8, at 109 ( 1978) (reviewing trade secret and unfair competition cases).
138. Lightfine, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 540, 542, 658 N.E.2d at 867, 868 (noting
that plaintiff conceded defendants were entitled to be reimbursed “for any
expenses incurred for the maintenance and preservation of the property,” and
later reciting the rule that reimbursement is appropriate for “expenses
incident to the preservation of [the] trust or for the benefit thereof”) (quoting
David v. Russo, 119 Ill. App. 3d 290, 297, 456 N.E.2d 342, 347 (1st Dist.
1983)).
139. Graham, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 768, 444 N.E.2d at 560 (“Furthermore,
plaintiffs agree that Mimms was entitled to reasonable compensation for his
efforts in developing the usurped opportunities [see DOBBS, supra note 30, at
243] and the court also erred in imposing a constructive trust on all the

2013]

Policy and Practice Lessons From Illinois

33

seems seriously doubtful in light of the strong Illinois public policy
requiring fiduciary compensation forfeiture for disloyalty as
expressed in Lightfine and many other cases.140 Again, however,
none of these cases explicitly dealt with the problem of tailoring
the constructive trust remedy to approximate the deal the
principal was seeking, nor does Professor Bogert’s hornbook.
Another, and I think better, way to look at the issue is simply
to treat corporate opportunities as “property” belonging to the
principal, at least as against the fiduciary. This was, in fact, the
way the Illinois Appellate Court characterized the corporate
opportunity doctrine in Graham.141 Under this “property” view, the
constructive trust question is conceptually straightforward and
indeed categorical: “[t]he rule has been established that property
which has been appropriated by another, and upon which a trust
has been fixed, may in equity be followed either in its original or
its altered form, so long as it can be identified, and so long as
superior rights of third parties have not intervened.”142 Under this
theory, the court should have full authority to impress a
constructive trust upon the “altered form” of the usurped property,
subject to whatever adjustments, if any, the court deems
equitable.143 In other words, as per the equitable maxim, “equity
compensation Mimms received from Wyclif”) (emphasis in original).
140. Lightfine, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 541-42, 658 N.E.2d at 868 (ordering
forfeiture of property management fee defendant LaReno paid himself for
managing the usurped property).
141. Graham, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 762, 444 N.E.2d at 556 (“In addition to this
proscription against misappropriating corporate property, the corporate
opportunity doctrine prohibits a corporation’s fiduciary from taking advantage
of business opportunities which are considered as ‘belonging’ to the
corporation (at least as far as the fiduciary is concerned).”).
142. Winger v. Chi. City Bank & Trust Co., 394 Ill. 94, 111, 67 N.E.2d 265,
276-77 (1946) (citing POMEROY, supra note 124, at 148). As Professor Pomeroy
observed in his treatise passage cited in Winger:
§ 1058c. Following Property into Its Product.—No change in the form of
the trust property, effected by the trustee, will impede the rights of the
beneficial owner to reach it and to compel its transfer, provided it can be
identified as a distinct fund, and is not so mingled up with other moneys
or property that it can no longer be specifically separated. So long as
the trust property can be traced and followed into other property into
which it has been converted, it remains subject to the trust. The
product or substitute has the nature of the original imparted to it. Thus
one who has purchased or improved real property with funds of another,
under circumstances which ordinarily would entitled such other person
to enforce a constructive trust in, or equitable lien against, the property,
cannot defeat the right to enforce the trust or lien on the ground that it
is homestead property and exempt from the claims of creditors.
Id. at 148-49 (internal footnotes omitted) (citing, among other cases, Moore v.
Taylor, 251 Ill. 468, 96 N.E. 229 (1911) (discussing trust tracing rules)).
143. Cf. Triple Five of Minnesota, Inc. v. Simon, 404 F.3d 1088, 1099-00 (8th
Cir. 2005) (holding that Mall of America general partner Simon usurped
corporate opportunity by acquiring limited partner TIAA’s interest in Mall of
America instead of sharing the TIAA interest opportunity with Simon’s co-
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regards as done that which ought to be done.”144
The case for forcing the transfer on the principal’s terms is
particularly compelling when the fiduciary and the third party
structure their deal precisely in order to defeat the principal’s
interests.145 This is always the scenario when fiduciaries compete
for corporate opportunities: they make topping offers to induce the
third party to go their way. If a court lacks authority to rearrange
deal terms when faced with such intentional wrongdoing, then
fiduciaries and third parties will escape with their prize in all but
the rare case where an “apples to apples” comparison can be made
between the principal’s proposed deal and the fiduciary’s final
deal. Such an outcome runs directly contrary to the “prophylactic
purpose” of the corporate opportunity doctrine in Illinois as laid
down in Kerrigan. Such an outcome also ignores Judge Cardozo’s
famous observations that “constructive trust is the formula
through which the conscience of equity finds expression”146 and
general partner Triple Five; ordering Simon removed and replaced by Triple
Five as managing general partner of Mall of America; and rejecting third
party TIAA’s objections on the ground “that TIAA’s hands were not exactly
unsullied with regard to the 1999 [Simon/TIAA sale] transaction, especially
when [TIAA] failed to notify Triple Five of its negotiations with [Simon] as
demanded by Herbert Simon in 1988. In this equitable action, we take this
into account.”); McGovern v. General Holding, Inc., 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 93,
*78-*84 (Del. Ch. May 18, 2006) (holding that general partner usurped
corporate opportunity by keeping title to new technologies; ordering removal of
general partner, dissolution of limited partnership, and appointment of a
receiver to sell the new technologies; and further ordering general partner not
to bid on the new technologies or to compete for three years, in order to avoid
chilling the bidding on the new technologies during the sale process).
144. Smithberg, 192 Ill. 2d at 300, 735 N.E.2d at 566 (2000).
145. Cf. DOBBS, supra note 30, §9.3(3), at 592-93 (discussing plaintiff’s
general duty of restoration). Specifically, Professor Dobbs has observed:
The plaintiff must also account for gains in the value of the property
now being restored to the plaintiff and due to the defendant’s payments
or improvements. For example, if the defendant made mortgage
payments on the property while it was in his name, the plaintiff is
enriched by reason of those payments and the defendant is entitled to
appropriate credits for them in adjusting his liability to the plaintiff.
Similarly, if the plaintiff recovers a business sold to the defendant and is
entitled to recover profits earned in the business while it was in the
defendant’s hands, he must credit the defendant with the value of the
defendant’s time and effort in the business.
However, the plaintiff must account to the defendant only for actual
benefits received when the transaction is avoided. The plaintiff owes
nothing for expenditures made by the defendant unless those
expenditures result in an unearned benefit to the plaintiff. The plaintiff
owes nothing for the defendant’s expenditures that do not improve the
property taken back by plaintiff; and he owes nothing for improvements
on the property which he does not want.
Id. (internal footnotes omitted).
146. Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 386, 122 N.E.
378, 380 (1918) (Cardozo, J.).
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that “the equity of the transaction must shape the measure of
relief.”147
6. “Adequate Remedy at Law”
Apart from its bearing on proximate cause, the tort-equity
distinction in favor of the Kinzer/Armstrong “agency-contractequity” view has important implications from a remedies
standpoint as well. Given its historical treatment as an equitable
rather than legal claim, a breach of fiduciary duty cause of action
should not be subject to an “adequate remedy at law” defense,
particularly when constructive trust relief is sought, as is
generally true in corporate opportunity cases. As Professor Dobbs
has explained:
Certain claims in equity were traditionally dismissed if the
chancellor thought the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy at
law. Claims subject to the adequacy rule were claims based on
rights the law courts recognized or created in the first place. The
plaintiff in such cases resorted to equity only in the hopes of a more
effective remedy for a legal right. The constructive trust claim is
different. It is not a claim based on a legal right. On the contrary,
constructive trusts are needed because legal title is in the
defendant. The plaintiff seeking a constructive trust does not assert
a legal right but an equitable interest. In this setting, the adequacy
of legal remedy seems irrelevant. Professor Palmer concludes that
the adequacy rule has no effect when the claim is against a
fiduciary, so that the case may proceed in equity even if there is an
adequate remedy at law; but when the defendant is not a fiduciary,
he believes the results are unpredictable.148

147. Id. at 389, 122 N.E. at 381.
148. DOBBS, supra note 30, § 4.3(2), at 595. Professor Dobbs goes on to note
the historical basis for the tension between chancery and common law courts,
illustrated by the famous Coke-Ellesmere dispute over the King’s Bench
judgment for Richard Glanvill in a jewel sale case, followed by the judgment
against and jailing of Glanvill by Chancery in the same contest, followed by
Glanvill’s habeas corpus release by King’s Bench, followed by Glanvill’s
further imprisonment by Chancery. Id. § 2.5(1), at 124 n.3 (discussing the
dispute, which Chancery won, as detailed in John P. Dawson, Coke and
Ellesmere Disinterred: The Attack on the Chancery in 1616, 36 ILL. L. REV. 127
(1941)). See also People v. Lawton, 212 Ill. 2d 285, 306-08, 818 N.E.2d 326,
339-40 (2004) (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting) (describing various writs – all
descended from the Coke-Ellesmere dispute – used to overturn Illinois
judgments prior to the adoption of § 2-1401 of the Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure and its statutory predecessors); PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS
CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE, at 88-93 (2010) (discussing the CokeEllesmere dispute, and the distinct jurisdictions of common law and equity, in
the course of examining the history of the writ of habeas corpus as an avenue
for escaping final judgments in criminal cases); Sir John Baker, The Common
Lawyers and the Chancery: 1616, reprinted in ALLEN BOYER, LAW, LIBERTY
AND PARLIAMENT: SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD COKE,
at 254-81 (2004) (discussing the Glanvill case in detail and Coke’s attempt to
use res judicata to block Ellesmere’s subsequent chancery encroachment on
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Professor Dobbs’ insights find strong support in Martin,
where the Illinois Supreme Court explicitly rejected an “adequate
remedy at law” defense to the fake foreign service fee / fiduciary
duty constructive trust claim.149 Thus, the corporate opportunity
decisions in Allstate Amusement Co. of Illinois, Inc. v. Pasinato150
and Graham v. Mimms151 and the business breakup decision in
Hagshenas v. Gaylord152 were simply wrong in holding that the
fiduciary duty / equitable relief claims therein were subject to an
“adequate remedy at law” defense.153 Not surprisingly, none of
these cases cited Illinois Supreme Court fiduciary duty precedent
in support of its erroneous holdings; all three preceded Martin,
and hence all three are not good law for their oxymoronic
“adequate remedy at law” assertions.154 Pasinato, Graham, and
Hagshenas obviously turn fiduciary duty law on its head from a
the initial common law judgment in favor of Glanvill); HAROLD J. BERMAN,
LAW AND REVOLUTION II: THE IMPACT OF THE PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS ON
THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 309-15 (2003) (discussing the expansion of
royal prerogative courts, including the Court of Chancery, during the TudorStuart periods, and then the ultimate triumph of the common law courts
following the English Revolution and the abolition of prerogative courts in
1640); PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 124-25 (2008) (noting the
“conflict between equitable and legal visions of judicial duty reached its depths
during the chancellorship of the irascible Lord Ellesmere” and quoting
Ellesmere’s declaration that he had “an absolute and uncontrollable Power” in
contrast to the limited power of common law judges).
149. Martin, 163 Ill. 2d at 78-79, 643 N.E.2d at 756 (constructive trust for
breach of fiduciary is not an action at law subject to trial by jury; in addition,
an action for an accounting for breach of fiduciary duty is not subject to an
adequate remedy at law defense, since breach of fiduciary duty has
traditionally been an action in equity).
150. 96 Ill. App. 3d 306, 308, 421 N.E.2d 374, 375-76 (1st Dist. 1981).
151. 111 Ill. App. 3d 751, 444 N.E.2d 549 (1st Dist. 1982).
152. 199 Ill. App. 3d 60, 78, 557 N.E.2d 316, 328 (2d Dist. 1990).
153. Cf. Jared Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in the Age of Balancing, 96
VA. L. REV. 485, 491-505 (2010) (rejecting the common assumption that
equitable balancing in injunction cases is an ancient doctrine and arguing that
such balancing began in the early 1800s in England and then first appeared in
America in an 1868 Pennsylvania nuisance case).
154. For example, in reversing the trial court’s award of constructive trust
relief for corporate opportunity usurpation, the Illinois Appellate Court in
Graham cited as its sole “adequate remedy at law” authority Sta-Ru Corp. v.
Mahin, 64 Ill. 2d 330, 356 N.E.2d 67 (1976), a taxpayer case that did not
involve fiduciaries. Hagshenas, too, reversed constructive trust relief on
“adequate remedy at law” grounds in a fiduciary duty case, citing Graham as
its sole authority and thereby perpetuating Graham’s monumental error.
Pasinato preceded Graham but committed the same sin: in denying injunctive
relief as to the usurped lease at issue it cited no fiduciary duty decision as
authority for its “adequate remedy at law” holding. The “adequate remedy at
law” cases it did cite, G.H. Sternberg & Co. v. Cellini, 16 Ill. App. 3d 1, 305
N.E.2d 317 (5th Dist. 1973) and Hall v. Orlikowski, 24 Ill. App. 3d 60, 321
N.E.2d 23 (2d Dist. 1974), were plainly not on point: Cellini involved a
contractor’s breach of contract claim against a government agency, and Hall
involved a homeowner’s breach of contract claim against a contractor over
home repairs.
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remedial standpoint.
Understanding the inapplicability of the “adequate remedy at
law” defense is important in corporate opportunity cases for
several reasons. First, absent undue delay, the victimized
principal should always have the choice of pursuing equitable or
legal relief under Section 407 of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency.155 Having this choice matters: proving plaintiff’s damages
is usually more difficult than proving the fiduciary’s gains, as one
can easily see in cases like Nordhem v. Harry’s Café, Inc.,156 Hill v.
Names and Addresses, Inc.,157 or the agonizing trilogy in Zokoych
v. Spalding.158 Second, forcing plaintiff to pursue its “adequate
remedy at law” in the form of damages invites enormous litigation
cost and delay in larger courts. For example, in the Circuit Court
of Cook County, a case may start in the Chancery Division for
preliminary injunction purposes and then be transferred to the
Law Division for a jury trial many years later on damages, as
illustrated by the 15 year corporate opportunity ordeal in Lozman
v. Putnam.159 Third, compelling plaintiff to pursue its “adequate
remedy at law” allows the fiduciary to use diverted deal profits to
fund his defense of the corporate opportunity charges against him,
in effect using plaintiff’s money to defeat plaintiff instead of
preserving that money under injunction. Fourth and most
important, depriving plaintiff of its right to recover the defendant’s
gains under the “adequate remedy at law” excuse negates the
deterrence rationale of fiduciary duty law. Without first knowing
the fiduciary’s gain, the court cannot determine whether the
155. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
156. 175 Ill. App. 3d 392, 529 N.E.2d 988 (1st Dist. 1988) (rejecting
plaintiff’s lost profits claim under Vendo, but awarding defendants’ profits).
157. 212 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 571 N.E.2d 1085 (1st Dist. 1991) (calculating and
then awarding alternative remedies of counter-defendant’s gains or counterplaintiff’s losses).
158. 36 Ill. App. 3d 654, 344 N.E.2d 805 (1st Dist. 1976) (reversing Judge
Cohen’s ruling, after first trial, that plaintiff’s stock in Ample Tool & Mfg., Inc.
was worthless after corporate opportunity usurpation and corporate
competition removed all company assets), appeal after remand, 84 Ill. App. 3d
661, 405 N.E.2d 1220 (1st Dist. 1980) (reversing Judge Berg’s ruling, after
second trial, that plaintiff’s stock in Ample was only worth $19,000), appeal
after further remand, 123 Ill. App. 3d 921, 463 N.E.2d 943 (1st Dist. 1984)
(affirming Judge Curry’s ruling, after third trial, that plaintiff’s stock in
Ample was worth $240,000, but reversing prejudgment interest award of
$127,000).
159. The Lozman case began in the Chancery Division in 1999, traveled to
the Illinois Appellate Court in 2002, returned for a jury trial in the Law
Division in late 2005, and then ended in a second trip to the Illinois Appellate
Court in 2008. See Lozman v. Putnam, 328 Ill. App. 3d 761, 767 N.E.2d 805
(1st Dist. 2002), later appeal, 379 Ill. App. 3d 807, 884 N.E.2d 756 (1st Dist.
2008). At the time this article went to press in 2014, the Lozman case was still
being litigated before the Illinois Appellate Court on a §2-1401 petition to
vacate the defense judgment that was affirmed in 2008. See Lozman v.
Putnam, No. 1-13-0104 (1st Dist. 2014).
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defendant’s gain exceeds plaintiff’s loss, leaving the fiduciary free
to profit from his wrong even after paying a damages award.
Every trapped fiduciary and third party attempts this “onetwo punch,” first arguing that damages is the sole remedy and
then bitterly contesting every damages assumption and projection
through years of jury trial damages litigation, with the third party
taking every opportunity to highlight its “refusal” as a damages
defense. The third party refusal to deal defense should not be
allowed to dictate the place and pace of corporate opportunity
cases; as noted, it should play no role at all.
7. Jury Instructions
Two interrelated points arise with respect to the third-party
refusal to deal defense in jury cases. First, because corporate
opportunity cases are “equitable” in nature, they should not be
subject to jury trials, at least in Illinois state courts. Second, to the
extent a jury trial is sought without contest in Illinois state court
or is pursued as a matter of right in Illinois federal court, the trial
court should be asked to give a preemptory jury instruction telling
the jury, in effect, that the third party’s willingness or
unwillingness to deal with plaintiff is irrelevant.
Illinois state and federal courts reach opposite results on the
jury trial right question because the state and federal
constitutional tests differ. Illinois Appellate Court decisions have
held that fiduciary duty claims were unknown at common law and
therefore are not subject to jury trial rights under the Illinois
Constitution.160 The Illinois Supreme Court left this question
unanswered in Martin v. Heinold Commodities, Inc.,161 holding
that the relief awarded in that case was equitable in nature and
therefore did not warrant a jury trial in any event.162 Federal
courts, conversely, follow a two-part test focusing predominantly
on the type of relief sought, with money damages requests
generally triggering Seventh Amendment jury trial rights.163
Assuming jury trials are available, the question becomes how
to instruct the jury on the irrelevance of the third party’s refusal to
deal. The plaintiff-principal should be permitted to seek a
preemptory instruction so that jurors do not assume a third party’s
160. Prodromos, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 169, 906 N.E.2d at 609 (collecting
Illinois state court decisions).
161. 163 Ill. 2d 33, 77-78, 643 N.E.2d 734, 755 (1994).
162. See also People ex rel. Daley v. Warren Motors, Inc., 114 Ill. 2d at 317,
500 N.E.2d at 27 (defendants had no jury trial rights since the fiduciary duty
claim therein sounded in equity).
163. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 214
(2002) (“for restitution to lie in equity, the action generally must seek not to
impose personal liability on the defendant, but to restore to the plaintiff
particular funds or property in the defendant’s possession”); Pereira v. Farace,
413 F.3d 330 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that jury trial rights in fiduciary duty
cases depend primarily upon the relief requested).
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willingness or unwillingness to deal with plaintiff somehow
negates or limits plaintiff’s damages recovery. In practice, this
problem would present itself almost as a matter of course in
retelling the events that led to the lawsuit: (1) in most cases, the
third party at some point turned its back on plaintiff’s bid and
gave the deal to the fiduciary, and thus the evidence suggests the
third party was unwilling to deal with plaintiff; or (2) in the rare
case, the principal never bid because it never learned of the
opportunity, and thus no evidence is offered to show the third
party was willing to deal with the plaintiff. A proper preemptory
instruction solves this problem by telling the jury that the court
has determined the third party’s willingness or unwillingness to
deal with plaintiff is irrelevant to the case. This may be a fiction in
a given case, but at least it is a fiction with a policy purpose.164
Preemptory instructions are governed by a discreet set of
rules. In general, the instruction must “contain all the facts and be
complete within itself.”165 If any substantial facts are omitted or
misstated, the preemptory instruction will mislead the jury and
will give rise to reversible error.166 Of course, as a necessary
corollary, instructions that accurately convey the law and facts to
the jury are perfectly appropriate.
No Illinois case has dealt with a third party “refusal to deal”
jury instruction, which is hardly surprising since to date all
reported Illinois corporate opportunity decisions other than Vendo
have involved bench trials. One corporate competition case, H.
Vincent Allen & Associates, Inc. v. Weis,167 concerning a fiduciary
who diverted customers, did involve a preemptory instruction, but
it was given for the defense and it did not address a “refusal to
deal” argument. Another Illinois corporate competition case, Pros
v. Mid-America Computer Corp.,168 concerned a mass walk-out
organized (or at least permitted) by an executive who was
unhappy with his compensation scheme, but the instructional
164. In re Walter J. Schmidt & Co., 298 F. 314, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1923)
(Learned Hand, J.) (“when the law adopts a fiction, it is, or at least it should
be, for some purpose of justice”).
165. H. Vincent Allen & Assoc’s, Inc. v. Weis, 63 Ill. App. 3d 285, 295, 379
N.E.2d 765, 772 (1st Dist. 1978) (quoting Duffy v. Cortesi, 2 Ill. 2d 511, 516,
119 N.E.2d 241, 244 (1954)).
166. Kelly v. C. Iber & Sons, Inc., 17 Ill. App. 2d 388, 150 N.E.2d 372 (2d
Dist. 1958) (peremptory instruction was improper because it failed to recite
proximate cause requirement).
167. 63 Ill. App. 3d 285, 296, 379 N.E.2d 765, 772 (1st Dist. 1978)
(disapproving defense’s proposed peremptory jury instruction because it
“limited liability to one area and omitted reference to [defendant’s] fiduciary
responsibilities and interference with the [plaintiff’s] studio business”).
168. 142 Ill. App. 3d 453, 463, 491 N.E.2d 851, 858 (2d Dist. 1986)
(“However, the mandatory direction the jury must find there has been a
breach of fiduciary duty absent evidence that a corporate officer did not
affirmatively discourage an employee walkout finds no semblance of support
from any source”).
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error there involved a misstatement of the executive’s fiduciary
duties under Delaware law, not a refusal to deal defense.
If one assumes a third party’s unwillingness to deal with the
plaintiff is not a defense in an Illinois corporate opportunity case,
an appropriate preemptory instruction might be as follows:
In this case, the plaintiff-principal [Jones Company] contends it
would have profited by having the benefit of the corporate
opportunity [to buy XYZ Company], had the defendant-fiduciary
[Smith] disclosed and tendered the opportunity to the plaintiffprincipal [Jones Company]. I instruct you here that a third party’s
willingness or unwillingness to deal with the plaintiff-principal is
irrelevant under the law. I therefore instruct you that you must
accept as a fact that the third party here [XYZ Company] would
have agreed to sell itself to the plaintiff-principal [Jones Company]
but for the failure of the defendant-fiduciary [Smith] to disclose and
tender the opportunity to the plaintiff-principal.

Although jury instructions are usually given at the end of the
case, plaintiff should consider asking the trial court to give an
instruction like this one at the outset of the case.169 Establishing
this fact early in the proceedings will clarify the jury’s
understanding of how to interpret the remaining evidence that will
almost certainly revolve around the third party’s testimony.170
8. Summary
As a matter of Illinois precedent, then, corporate opportunity
claims should not be subject to the same standards as ordinary
tort claims; in fact, they should not be subject to tort standards at
all. Treating corporate opportunity claims as part of the
Kinzer/Armstrong fiduciary duty regime governed by the “agencycontract-equity” inquiry is the better approach, and it carries with
169. E.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY
TRIALS, Principle 6(C)(1) (recommending preliminary jury instructions);
Katherine A. Wittenberg, Seventh Circuit Jury Project Confirms Innovations,
ABA LITIGATION NEWS (Nov. 25, 2008) (reporting positive results of pilot
project’s use of preliminary jury instructions, which involved providing jurors
with substantive instructions—including an explicit description of the claims,
the requisite elements of proof, and the other essential law governing the case
– before any evidence was presented at trial), available at
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/article-juryproject.html.
170. For example, under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b), a criminal
defendant’s right to a fair trial is protected by the trial court asking
prospective jurors if they understand and accept that (1) the defendant is
presumed innocent, (2) the state must prove the defendant is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, (3) the defendant is not required to present evidence on his
behalf, and (4) the defendant’s failure to testify cannot be held against him.
See People v. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d 472, 469 N.E.2d 1062 (1984) (establishing the
basis for Rule 431(b)); People v. Calabrese, 398 Ill. App. 3d 98, 924 N.E.2d 6
(2d Dist. 2010) (rejecting defense argument that each of the Zehr questions
must be asked and answered individually).
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it important implications for the third party refusal to deal
defense. Eliminating jury trials ends the opportunity for sympathy
and confusion arising out of the third party’s pro-defense
testimony. Eliminating the adequate remedy at law defense
underscores plaintiff’s right to choose its remedy and leads to
expedited and comprehensive recoveries via constructive trust and
injunctive relief, both of which are directed to the defendant, not
the third party. Eliminating the tort conception of proximate
cause, of course, makes it clear that plaintiff is entitled to at least
some relief once a breach of duty has been established, regardless
of the third party’s willingness to deal with plaintiff. And focusing
on the fiduciary’s duties reminds the court that the third party’s
interests and expectations are irrelevant. Streamlining the
inquiries in this manner is the best way to deter fiduciary
misconduct.
B. Third Parties
By my count, at least 29 Illinois state and federal court
corporate opportunity decisions have been influenced directly or
indirectly by third parties, with the most egregious turning on
“refusal to deal” defenses. Yet surprisingly enough, despite this
profusion of cases, few involved third parties named as
defendants, and none analyzed claims against such third parties
asserting a refusal to deal,171 with the exception of Foodcomm
International v. Barry.172 The practical reason for this paucity of
authority, I assume, is the understandable reluctance of all firms
to sue their customers and other trading partners, especially with
a deal hanging in the balance. But some corporate opportunity
cases warrant action against third parties, and a few may even
171. Regal-Beloit Corp., 955 F. Supp. at 867, n.13 (“Thus, while it is unclear
whether [nominal defendant] Brad Foote is subject to any legal liability for its
conduct, Brad Foote was not truly an innocent third-party – it knew or should
have known of the impropriety of the Individual Defendants’ [fiduciary]
conduct and did nothing”); Lightfine, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 539, 658 N.E.2d at 866
(noting question of whether plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proof by
failing to name the legal owner of the diverted property, but then resolving the
issue in the unpublished, non-precedential portion of its opinion); Lindenhurst
Drugs, Inc., 154 Ill. App. 3d at 62, 506 N.E.2d at 646 (noting plaintiff had sued
Becker “and other defendants not parties to this appeal,” presumably referring
to the third party landlord and the third party franchisor); Comedy Cottage,
Inc., 145 Ill. App. 3d at 358, 495 N.E.2d at 1010 (noting Comedy Cottage sued
third-party landlord Swanson for civil conspiracy with Berk, but Swanson
settled by agreeing to take a “neutral position” in the litigation and to be
bound by the court’s decision regarding the right to lease and possess the
premises); Patient Care Services, Inc., 32 Ill. App. 3d at 1023, 337 N.E.2d at
474 (noting that Patient Care Services had named third-party Little Company
of Mary Hospital as a defendant earlier in the litigation, but offering no legal
analysis of Little Company’s actions and failing to identify the cause of action
against it).
172. 463 F. Supp. 2d 818 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
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require it.
Examining potential claims against third parties is important
to dispel what I believe is an unspoken but powerful myth that
quietly sways the outcome in many corporate opportunity cases:
“the customer is always right.” Actually, in my view, “the customer
is always wrong” is closer to the truth, at least when the customer
or other third party knows the fiduciary is betraying his principal.
Customers and other third parties enjoy no special immunity from
secondary liability when knowingly participating in or benefiting
from fiduciary wrongdoing. Understanding this simple point goes a
long way toward eliminating the misguided third party “refusal to
deal” defense and establishing the third party’s proper role as a codefendant.
1. Secondary Liability
Illinois law gives an injured principal a variety of secondary
liability theories it can claim against third parties caught assisting
fiduciary wrongdoers. These include tortious interference with
employment, civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and collusion.
The effect of these theories is to make third parties jointly or
vicariously liable for others’ fiduciary sins when third parties
know or have reason to know wrongdoing is afoot.173
Mullaney is the only modern Illinois Supreme Court corporate
opportunity decision to analyze secondary liability for a fiduciary’s
opportunity usurpation, although Dowd & Dowd v. Gleason
approved such secondary claims in principle.174 To revisit
Mullaney for a moment, Savage diverted the Blossman stock
option opportunity from his employer, Mullaney, Wells & Co., to
his secret partner, Williams, and then they later transferred the
option sale proceeds to Glen Ellyn Corporation, an entity Savage
and Williams controlled. The supreme court thought the operative
secondary liability principles so self-evident that it felt no need to
173. E.g., LCOR Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *27 (“Under Illinois law, any
third party that has ‘colluded with a fiduciary in committing a breach of duty,
and who obtained a benefit therefrom,’ is liable to that fiduciary’s principal”)
(quoting Kenroy, 78 Ill. 2d at 565, 402 N.E.2d at 186); Adcock v. Brakegate,
Ltd., 164 Ill. 2d 54, 62, 645 N.E.2d 888, 894 (1994) (“The function of a
conspiracy claim is to extend liability in tort beyond the active wrongdoer to
those who have merely planned, assisted or encouraged the wrongdoer’s act”);
Paul H. Schwendener, Inc. v. Jupiter Elec. Co., 358 Ill. App. 3d 65, 829 N.E.2d
818 (1st Dist. 2005) (director of insolvent company owed fiduciary duty to
creditors; banks induced director’s breach of fiduciary duty by participating in
transaction that drained the corporation of assets); Thornwood, Inc. v. Jenner
& Block, 344 Ill. App. 3d 15, 799 N.E.2d 756 (1st Dist. 2003) (recognizing
action against law firm for aiding and abetting client’s breach of fiduciary
duty).
174. Dowd & Dowd v. Gleason, 181 Ill. 2d 460, 485-86, 693 N.E.2d 358, 37172 (1998) (holding that civil conspiracy claim against start-up law firm, to
impose vicarious liability upon it for past fiduciary wrongdoing by its founders,
was a valid claim that had been prematurely dismissed).
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cite authority for its holdings:
We turn next to the question whether the defendants Williams and
Glen Ellyn were also liable for the actions of Savage, a point the
appellate court did not reach. The master found that Williams and
Savage were partners in the Blossman transaction, and that
Williams thus became jointly and severally liable for the acts of
Savage. Although Savage and Williams did not have a formal
partnership agreement, each of them testified that they had an oral
understanding that there would be a 50-50 sharing of profits; each
of their names appeared on the stock options; and Williams actively
participated in the negotiations from an early stage.
Williams was necessarily aware that the plaintiff would not be a
participant in the Blossman transaction. The master also found that
Williams’ prior contact with Savage in a transaction handled
through the plaintiff put Williams on notice of Savage’s relationship
to the plaintiff, and that he should have inquired of the plaintiff as
to whether it had any interest in the Blossman transaction. The
master accordingly concluded that Williams was liable to the
plaintiff for Savage’s breach of fiduciary obligations.
As for Glen Ellyn, since Savage and Williams were its president and
vice-president, respectively, and also two of its three directors, the
third being their attorney, and since the benefits to it from the
Blossman transaction were not received as a bona fide purchaser
without notice, the master found Glen Ellyn liable as well.
We agree with the conclusions reached by the master with regard to
both Williams and Glen Ellyn.175

Mullaney was matter-of-fact about the secondary liability
issues, and rightly so. The third party liability facts in Mullaney
were relatively easy, in as much as Williams was Savage’s partner
and Glen Ellyn was their joint creation. Williams obviously knew
what was going on and was only too happy to participate in the
profits. But it is important to note that the Illinois Supreme
Court’s holdings concerning Williams’ “awareness” and “notice” did
not depend upon Williams’ legal knowledge. Rather, it was his
knowledge of Savage’s agency relationship with Mullaney, Wells &
Co. and his knowledge of Savage’s betrayal of his principal’s
interests that doomed Williams.
The same result can be found in another disloyal agent case,
Beaton & Associates, Ltd. v. Joslyn Manufacturing & Supply Co.176
Fearing a strike at its plant, Joslyn Manufacturing in early 1979
turned to Washburn, its vice president and director of industrial
relations, to make arrangements for appropriate plant security. A
few weeks later, Washburn resigned his positions with Joslyn but
remained employed by Joslyn as an advisor and consultant to its
president.
In his written consulting agreement, Washburn

175. Mullaney, Wells & Co., 78 Ill. 2d at 550, 402 N.E.2d at 582.
176. 159 Ill. App. 3d 834, 512 N.E.2d 1286 (1st Dist. 1987).
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promised to do nothing detrimental to Joslyn, and Washburn
thereafter formed his own labor consulting firm, J.W. Associates,
with Joslyn’s knowledge. One of Washburn’s responsibilities
continued to be planning security in case of a strike, and to this
end he considered three security firms before choosing one, Beaton
& Associates, to guard Joslyn’s plant on an hourly-rate basis.
The problem in this otherwise routine relationship was that
Beaton, filled with gratitude over its Joslyn contract, decided to
pay Washburn “referral fees” tied to the hours Washburn assigned
Beaton and its supervisor, McGinley. This incentive arrangement
– called a kickback in less polite company – was entered into on
the same day as the Joslyn-Beaton contract, but it was not
disclosed to Joslyn. When Joslyn discovered this secret side deal, it
refused to pay Beaton’s bill on fraud grounds. The appellate court
sided with Joslyn, offering the following analysis:
The record in the instant case shows that Washburn was an agent
for Joslyn, planning security services for Joslyn’s plant on Joslyn’s
behalf. The trial court, therefore, correctly found that Washburn
committed a fraud on Joslyn by accepting plaintiff’s referral fee
without informing Joslyn.
Plaintiff and McGinley do not escape liability. If a third party
“accepts the fruits of fraud knowing of the means by which they
were obtained he is liable even though he did not personally
participate in the fraud.” [Citation omitted.] Plaintiff and McGinley
accepted the fruits of Washburn’s fraud; they received the Joslyn
plant security project from Washburn. * * * Plaintiff and McGinley
additionally argue that they did not know, and that a court should
not have expected them to know, that Washburn was Joslyn’s agent,
owing fiduciary duties to Joslyn. Thus, plaintiff and McGinley
argue, they did not receive the Joslyn project based on Washburn’s
fraud.
The record shows, however, that plaintiff and McGinley knew that
Washburn acted on behalf of Joslyn. Washburn contacted plaintiff
and negotiated with it[.] The trial court’s finding that plaintiff
received the Joslyn security project as a result of its referral fee to
Washburn, whom plaintiff and McGinley knew to be Joslyn’s agent,
was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.177

The holding in Beaton was certainly congruent with
Mullaney; both decisions looked to the third party’s knowledge of
the fiduciary’s agency status and betrayal, rather than knowledge
of the legality of the agent’s conduct, as their touchstones. Beaton
was also closer to the third party facts of most of the corporate
opportunity cases surveyed here, in the sense that Beaton was a
third party which otherwise had a legitimate right to act primarily
for its own interests in dealing with plaintiff, absent its
participation in Washburn’s fiduciary wrongdoing. But factually,

177. Id. at 843, 512 N.E.2d at 1291.
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Beaton was not quite on point for purposes of our inquiry, because
Beaton was not claiming a right to choose between Joslyn and
Washburn as bidders competing for Beaton’s favor.
Still closer to the mark is Stathis v. Geldermann, Inc.178 In
that case, Gus Stathis funded and owned an options clearing firm,
Star Clearing, run by his son, James. Geldermann sought to
purchase Star Clearing, and James handled the sale. The net
effect of the transaction was the transfer of all personnel,
customers, and other assets from Star Clearing to a new
Geldermann subsidiary, with James remaining at the helm of the
new entity. Gus then emerged claiming James lacked authority to
sell Star Clearing to Geldermann, and Gus charged Geldermann
with conspiring with James to divert a corporate opportunity.
Specifically, Gus alleged “that it was Geldermann which presented
the corporate opportunity, found a way to acquire it without
paying for it, and did so by conspiring and acting in concert with
the manager [James] who owed a fiduciary duty to plaintiff, which
was allegedly well known to Geldermann.”179 On any reading,
Stathis stands for the proposition that the third party whose deal
is at issue can be secondarily liable to the victimized principal, so
long as the disloyal agent is acting without authorization.180
I also pressed this issue directly on behalf of Foodcomm in
Foodcomm following the Seventh Circuit’s injunction opinion.181
My argument was that third party Empire Beef was a coconspirator of Foodcomm fiduciaries Leacy and Barry and as such
was vicariously liable for their disloyalty in diverting the Empire
Beef redistribution opportunity away from Foodcomm. More
precisely, my argument was that Empire Beef was indirectly liable
to Foodcomm in tort even though it could not be directly liable to
Foodcomm in contract. The district court found that sufficient
evidence showed Empire Beef was aware of the fiduciary
misconduct of Leacy and Barry at the time Empire Beef joined in
their actions and therefore denied Empire Beef’s summary
judgment motion. The district specifically held that Empire Beef
did not have to form a legal conclusion that Leacy and Barry were
breaching their fiduciary duties in order for Empire Beef to be
liable.182 Rather, the court observed, under Illinois civil conspiracy
178. 258 Ill. App. 3d 690, 630 N.E.2d 926 (1st Dist. 1994).
179. Id. at 701, 630 N.E.2d at 934.
180. At trial, it emerged that Gus had written a letter fully authorizing
James to do the sale, and James had given the letter to Geldermann –
prompting the jury to side with Geldermann on the claims. See Stathis, 295 Ill.
App. 3d at 856, 692 N.E.2d at 807 (“A jury reasonably could conclude from the
language of the letter [from Gus to James] that James had actual, express
authority to enter into the 1986 [sale] agreement with Geldermann, by which
Gus agreed to be bound.”).
181. Schaller, supra note 15, at 1022.
182. Foodcomm Int’l v. Barry, 463 F. Supp.2d 818 (N.D. Ill. 2006). Cf.
Hexion Specialty Chemicals, Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 747 and n.

46

The John Marshall Law Review

[47:1

law, “[a] defendant who understands the general objectives of the
conspiratorial scheme, accepts them, and agrees, either explicitly
or implicitly to do its part to further those objectives[,] is liable as
a conspirator.”183 The district court then offered the following
pertinent analysis:
Empire and Outback must have simply understood “the general
objectives” of the civil conspiracy scheme to breach the alleged
fiduciary duties, accept those objectives, and agree with the
objectives, either explicitly or implicitly, to further the objectives of
breaching the alleged fiduciary duties. Simply because Empire and
Outback did not understand the legal terminology or the details of
the law, they are not shielded from liability.
Empire and Outback also argue that the individuals responsible for
hiring Barry and Leacy “had no idea that Barry and Leacy allegedly
owed fiduciary duties to Foodcomm.” (Mem. DSJ 6). Additionally,
Empire and Outback contend that the individuals responsible for
hiring Barry and Leacy “did not have any occasion to explore the
duties of Barry and Leacy to Foodcomm because, as Levine testified,
he was ‘hiring two good salesmen to sell meat to [Empire’s] existing
account base.’” (Mem. DSJ 6). However, knowledge by Empire that:
Barry and Leacy were Foodcomm’s employees; Leacy was in charge
of the Empire account; and Leacy was involved in business
negotiations between Foodcomm and Empire could lead a trier of
fact to conclude that the actions of Empire and Outback were an
implicit agreement to further Barry’s and Leacy’s breach of their
alleged fiduciary duties. Additionally, a trier of fact could conclude
that receiving the business plan from Barry and Leacy, seeking
legal advice from Empire’s attorney about Leacy’s confidentiality
agreement with Foodcomm, financing Outback, and distributing
shareholder agreements to Barry and Leacy could constitute
agreement to further the alleged breaches of fiduciary duties by
Barry and Leacy.184

Thus, there is no substantive reason why a third party cannot
be liable for conspiring to divert its own deal away from the
plaintiff-principal. The reason this odd-sounding formulation
makes sense is that the third party’s liability arises from the
illegal activities of others, in this case fiduciaries. Anyone who
knows a fiduciary is misbehaving should be on his guard about
joining in the fun. And it is safe to say that in almost every case
reviewed here, the third parties were well aware (1) that they
were dealing with someone else’s fiduciary and (2) that the

87 (Del. Ch. 2008) (offering extended discussion of the meaning of the phrase
“knowing and intentional breach” in the contract context and holding that
“mistake of law virtually never excuses a violation of law,” but then noting
that the rule is different for third party liability: “[k]nowing participation in a
board’s fiduciary breach requires the third party act with the knowledge that
the conduct advocated or assisted constitutes such a breach”).
183. Id. at 831 (quoting Adcock, 164 Ill. 2d at 64, 645 N.E.2d at 894).
184. Id.
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fiduciary was bidding against or in lieu of his principal. Only in
Mile-O-Mo Fishing Club did the fiduciary affirmatively tell the
third party he was still acting on behalf of his principal in
acquiring the property in his own name. In virtually all the rest,
the third party knew or had reason to know something was amiss,
but kept quiet to see who would offer the best deal. Indeed, in
Patient Care Services and LCOR, the third parties actually had the
temerity to try to take advantage of fiduciary disloyalty, openly
pitting the principals in those cases against their own fiduciaries
in bidding wars until courts intervened.
2. Remedies against Third Parties
Equitable relief against the fiduciary is the traditional and
primary relief usually sought in Illinois corporate opportunity
cases, and the same relief extends with full force to third parties
who knowingly participate in or benefit from fiduciary misconduct.
For example, unless the third party holds a position akin to a bona
fide purchaser for value without notice, a court of equity always
has the authority to impress a constructive trust on wrongfully
obtained property a fiduciary transfers to complicit third
parties.185 This was the situation in the property usurpation
decision in Bakalis. When Bressler obtained the property leased by
the partnership, he gave it to his wife as a “gift.”186 Despite this
“gift,” the court ordered Bressler and his wife to convey half of the
property ownership to Bakalis. The court did so, of course, because
Bressler’s wife, having paid nothing for the property herself, could
not qualify as a bona fide purchaser.
Unjust enrichment is another equitable theory commonly
asserted against third parties in corporate opportunity cases.
Williams’ liability for Savage’s wrongful gain in Mullaney
furnishes one example of a third party’s liability for unjust
enrichment in this context. Another, involving a slightly different
fiduciary duty claim for bribery, can be found in Chicago Park
District v. Kenroy.187 That case arose at the dawn of “honest
services” federal prosecutions of state and local officials for
corruption,188 with Chicago Alderman Paul Wigoda as one of the
185. E.g., Kenroy, 78 Ill. 2d 555, 402 N.E.2d 181 (third party property
owners who bribed public official to breach his fiduciary duties in connection
with condemnation proceeding could be ordered to make restitution on the $10
million condemnation award they received); Winger, 394 Ill. at 117, 67 N.E.2d
at 279-80 (holding that third party Stice was not a bona fide purchaser in a
breach of fiduciary duty case); Village of Wheeling v. Stavros, 89 Ill. App. 3d
450, 411 N.E.2d 1067 (1st Dist. 1980) (constructive trust may be imposed upon
benefits obtained by a third person through his knowledge of or involvement
in a public official’s breach of fiduciary duty).
186. Bakalis, 1 Ill. 2d 72, 75, 115 N.E.2d 323, 325 (1953).
187. Kenroy, 78 Ill. 2d 555, 402 N.E.2d 181.
188. WILLIAM E. BARNHART & EUGENE F. SCHLICKMAN, KERNER: THE
CONFLICT OF INTANGIBLE RIGHTS 287-319 (1999) (examining the origin and
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early prizes. Federal prosecutors pursued and convicted Wigoda
for pocketing $50,000 in bribes in return for rezoning property the
Chicago Park District wanted to purchase for use as a golf
course.189 The net effect of Wigoda’s bribe was to vastly increase
the value of the property from $5 million to $10 million for
condemnation purposes, leaving the bribe payers (the property
owners) very happy on their investment returns. When the
Chicago Park District discovered this fiduciary misconduct by
Wigoda, it brought an action against the third party property
owners to recover their unjust enrichment in the form of the
excessive condemnation award. The Illinois Supreme Court found
that this was a valid unjust enrichment cause of action against the
property owners.190
Just as the third-parties were subject to equitable relief in
Bakalis, Mullaney, and Kenroy, a third party can also be liable for
damages for another’s breach of fiduciary duty. Zokoych v.
Spalding191 offers an excellent example. In that case, greatly
simplified, Zokoych and Spalding agreed to be equal owners of
Ample Tool & Manufacturing, Inc. Spalding later transferred all
of Ample Tool’s assets to a new company, Spalding Manufacturing,
leaving Zokoych with nothing but debts that he had guaranteed
for Ample Tool. In order to accomplish this transfer, Spalding
enlisted the help of Ample’s bank, West Suburban Bank, which
held a security interest in Ample Tool’s assets. West Suburban
Bank went along with Spalding’s fraudulent transfer, later
arguing that Ample Tool was in “default” under its loan agreement
and that it was just protecting its security interest. The trial court
found Spalding guilty of corporate opportunity usurpation and
asset theft and rejected West Suburban Bank’s argument that it
was merely acting as a creditor, as the court determined no
“default” had occurred on Ample Tool’s part. Multiple trials and
appeals then ensued, with each ending in an increased damages
history of the “honest services” / “intangible rights” doctrine in federal
prosecutions of Illinois politicians, starting with former Governor Otto
Kerner).
189. United States v. Wigoda, 521 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1975) (affirming
Wigoda’s conviction).
190. The Illinois Supreme Court’s imposition of fiduciary liability on public
officials in Kenroy and City of Chicago ex rel. Cohen v. Keane, 64 Ill. 2d 559,
357 N.E.2d 452 (1976), anticipated by decades the current academic debate
over the fiduciary foundations of public authority. See, e.g., D. Theodore Rave,
Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671 (2013) (analogizing political
incumbents’ self-dealing in gerrymandering to corporate self-dealing
problems); Heather K. Gerkin & Michael S. Karg, Déjà Vu All Over Again:
Courts, Corporate Law, and Election Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. 86 (2013)
(elaborating on Rave’s agency cost parallel between corporate law and election
law); Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, Translating Fiduciary
Principles Into Public Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. 91 (2013) (questioning Rave’s
private law model for public actors).
191. 36 Ill. App. 3d 654, 344 N.E.2d 805 (1st Dist. 1976).
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award in favor of Zokoych and against Spaulding and West
Suburban Bank.192
3. No Contract Defenses for Third Parties
Perhaps the most counterintuitive aspect of the third party
“refusal to deal” problem is that remedies against the third party
are derived from the claims against the fiduciary. In other words,
even though the third party never entered into a contract with the
plaintiff-principal and therefore cannot be directly liable to the
principal, the third party can still be indirectly liable to the
principal based upon the fiduciary’s actions. This means, in
practice, that the third party will not be able to raise its contract
defenses to the plaintiff’s opportunity diversion / vicarious liability
claim against the third party.
No Illinois corporate opportunity case has directly addressed
this “no contract defense” issue relating to third parties, but it was
taken up by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in S & K Sales
Co. v. Nike, Inc.193 Somewhat simplified, S & K Sales was a
supplier looking to maintain its relationship with Nike. S & K’s
key employee in charge of the Nike account, Johnson, approached
Nike about jumping ship to Nike and cutting out the middle man –
his employer S & K. Nike went along, Johnson switched sides, and
then S & K sued both. After being found vicariously liable itself for
Johnson’s $1.1 million fiduciary duty liability, Nike appealed and
argued that its contractual right to terminate its contract with S &
K precluded the award against it. The Second Circuit disagreed:
Nike launches several attacks on the district court’s award of
damages. It argues first that it could not be liable in damages for
breaking the 1982 Agreement because that agreement was
terminable on thirty days’ notice. As Judge Ward rightly noted,
though, the fact that the agreement was terminable without cause is
irrelevant when “the conduct alleged breaches a legal duty which
exists ‘independent of contractual relations between the parties.’”
Hargrave v. Oki Nursery, Inc., 636 F.2d 897, 899 (2d Cir. 1980)
(quoting Channel Master Corp. v. Aluminum Limited Sales, Inc., 4
N.Y.2d 403, 408, 151 N.E.2d 833, 836, 176 N.Y.S.2d 259, 263
(1958)). Here, the duty breached by Johnson and participated in by
Nike was clearly different from and independent of any duties under
the 1982 Agreement. Thus, once it is established that the agreement
was terminated as a result of Nike’s participation in Johnson’s
breach, S & K was entitled to recover for its loss. See Whitney, 782
F.2d at 1115 (plaintiff is entitled to recover for “any damage”
caused); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874 & comment c.

This result is consistent with Illinois cases in other areas of

192. See supra note 158 (setting forth the subsequent history of the Zokoych
case).
193. 816 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1987).
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the law. For example, in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.,194 plaintiff was
an at will employee of Motorola. She claimed she was fired for
asserting her workers’ compensation rights following a workplace
injury and brought a wrongful discharge action. Even though
plaintiff was terminable at will as a contractual matter, the court
held plaintiff could proceed with her retaliatory discharge “tort”
claim. In other words, Motorola’s contractual right to terminate
Kelsay at will, meaning without cause and without notice –
ordinarily a complete defense to a wrongful dismissal claim – was
no defense to Kelsay’s independent “tort” claim.
If a direct tort claim by one contract party against another is
not subject to contract defenses, as in Kelsay, an indirect tort claim
against a third party – whether cast as aiding and abetting or civil
conspiracy – also should not be subject to contract defenses. The
same is even truer when the plaintiff and the third party never
had a contract with one another, and this is the typical scenario in
corporate opportunity cases in which the fiduciary successfully
seizes the opportunity before his principal and the third party
have a chance to develop a relationship. Thus, the third party
“defense” that it had an absolute right to terminate its contract
with plaintiff, or that it had an absolute right not to renew its
contract with plaintiff, or that it had an absolute right not to enter
into a contract with plaintiff in the first place, is no defense at all
to the third party’s vicarious liability in tort arising from another’s
breach of fiduciary duty. The same should be at least as true when
the third party’s liability arises in equity, as in Mullaney.
III. POLICY AND PRECEDENT: BANNING THE THIRD PARTY
REFUSAL TO DEAL DEFENSE
As this detailed review has shown, third parties always play
some role in corporate opportunity cases. This has to be true in
every case, since corporate opportunities by definition present
three-cornered disputes: the plaintiff-principal and the defendantfiduciary are vying for the third party’s affections with respect to a
deal. This configuration might seem to invite a balancing of the
equities as among the three interested parties, but that is
decidedly not the case in Illinois. As a matter of policy and
precedent, the Illinois Supreme Court from Kerrigan forward has
taken the view that the corporate opportunity doctrine is a
“prophylactic” rule intended for the protection of trusting
principals. If the defendant was in a fiduciary relationship with
respect to the opportunity, and if the opportunity falls within the
corporation’s “line of business,” fiduciary deterrence becomes the
controlling policy consideration. Absent full disclosure, timely
tender, and clear consent, the inquiry is at an end.
This is sound policy. It is not asking too much to require
194. 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
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fiduciaries to disclose and tender opportunities and to secure their
principal’s consent. This avoids all the uncertainty associated with
after-the-fact inquiries to discern third party intent. It also avoids
the time, effort, and cost expended in pursuing these third party
intent inquiries. Avoiding unnecessary discovery and trial
proceedings over irrelevant and fictional facts is all to the good. It
also makes sense: nothing about the Illinois Supreme Court’s
categorical Kerrigan rule invites consideration of the interests of
fiduciaries or third parties.195
In the abstract, one could create a regime in which the
motives of third parties could be examined ad nauseum, and in
some instances – like the Franciscan Fathers in Glasser v.
Essaness Theatres Corp.196 – a court might even be able to declare
with some confidence what the third party would or would not
have done in the absence of the fiduciary’s wrongdoing.197 But as
my review of Illinois cases in my second article shows, Glasser
stands alone in this respect. In almost every other case, the third
party happily took advantage of the situation, playing the
fiduciary off against his principal to get what the third party
undoubtedly believed was the best deal for the third party.198 In
the handful of cases in which the third party appeared adamantly
opposed to the principal, the outcome can be explained on the
grounds that the fiduciary either induced the third party’s refusal,
fueled it by angering the third party, or at least failed to quell it by
making the best case for his principal – always as a prelude to the
fiduciary’s own proposal, of course.
Apart from wanting to get and keep the best deal, third
parties have an entirely separate and arguably deeper motive to
side with fiduciaries once they are caught in bed with them. In
virtually every case, the third party faces potential liability for
civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting, or collusion by virtue of its
knowledge that the defendant-fiduciary was plaintiff’s agent
acting against the interests of his principal. In fact, of all the cases
reviewed here, just one presented a factual scenario in which this
was not true: only in Mile-O-Mo was a third party led to believe
that the agent was acting on behalf of his principal in doing the
195. Cf. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 181 Ill. 2d at 484, 693 N.E.2d at 371 (“The
focus here is not on the conduct of the client in terminating the relationship,
but on the conduct of the party inducing the breach or interfering with the
expectancy”).
196. Glasser v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 414 Ill. 180, 111 N.E.2d 124
(1953).
197. Cf. United States v. Vrdolyak, 593 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J.)
(discussing possible actions prospective buyers might have taken in the
absence of Vrdolyak’s bribery / kickback scheme with fiduciary pretending to
act on behalf of seller).
198. Cf. Epstein, supra note 4, at 959 (“Each partner may divert firm
business to his own private account, all at a sporting discount, if only the
customer remains quiet about the special arrangement”).
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deal in his own name. Thus, unless a case presents the rare facts
of Mile-O-Mo, or unless the third party had no reason to know the
fiduciary was the agent for the principal in the first place, third
parties should face secondary liability as a matter of course in
Illinois corporate opportunity cases. One need only think of
“receiving stolen goods” prosecutions to grasp this obvious point.199
The third party refusal to deal defense clearly has no role in
defining duty under Kerrigan, and it would be poor policy to invite
the third party refusal to deal in through the back door of
proximate cause. If this paper demonstrates nothing else, surely it
shows that third parties are eager in every case to cut the best
deal for themselves by pitting the principal against the agent. In
most cases, this occurred without the principal’s knowledge, but in
some – like Patient Care Services and LCOR – it took place openly.
Kerrigan, however, is not an auction protection rule for the benefit
of third parties; it is a loyalty enforcement rule for the benefit of
principals.
In the end, the third party refusal to deal defense should be
rejected for the most basic reason of all: it invites temptation. As
Lord Chancellor King said nearly three-hundred years ago in
Keech v. Sandford, “if a trustee, on refusal to renew, might have a
lease to himself, few trust-estates would be renewed to the cestui
que use.”200 That the third party landlord had refused to renew the
lease in favor of the trust in Keech was no excuse for the trustee to
seize it for himself. “It is sufficient that if he were permitted to
keep the benefit, this would create the temptation to fiduciaries to
act in that manner.”201 Such conflicts of interest should be
prohibited regardless of injury, as Justice Jackson elegantly
explained in Mosser v. Darrow, “not because such interests are

199. People v. Garmon, 394 Ill. App. 3d 997, 916 N.E.2d 1191 (1st Dist.
2009) (evidence was sufficient to show that defendant knew the cell phones he
purchased were stolen based on an explicit representation of a law
enforcement officer).
200. Sel. Cas. T. King, 25 Eng. Rep. 223 (Ch. 1726), quoted in PALMER,
supra note 1, §2.11, at 146 n. 18. Specifically, Lord Chancellor King in Keech
held:
I must consider this as a trust for the infant; for I very well see, if a
trustee, on the refusal to renew, might have a lease to himself, few trust
estates would be renewed to cestui que use; though I do not say there is
a fraud in this case, yet he should rather have let it run out, than to
have had the lease to himself. This may seem hard, that the trustee is
the only person of all mankind who might not have the lease: but it is
very proper that rule should be strictly pursued, and not in the least
relaxed; for it is very obvious what would be the consequence of letting
trustees have the lease, on refusal to renew to cestui que use. So
decreed, that the lease should be assigned to the infant, and that the
trustee should be indemnified from any covenants comprised in the
lease, and an account of the profits made since the renewal.
201. PALMER, supra note 1, §2.11, at 146.
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always corrupt but because they are always corrupting.”202
IV. CONCLUSION
For both business and legal reasons, third party self-interest
should be expected,203 which is why the categorical Kerrigan rule
rightly ignores the third party’s interest. To say that the thirdparty’s position was etched in stone in any of these cases is to
ignore both business reality and human nature. In all but the
rarest case, there is no way to meaningfully test the
“unalterability” of the third party’s refusal after-the-fact.
Moreover, once caught, the third party has almost no choice but to
side with the fiduciary, as the third party invariably faces
potential collusion liability itself at that point and certainly faces
business disruption through loss of its chosen partner, the
fiduciary wrongdoer.204 These incentives call for a per se rule
against such third party testimony.205
The best guide here is the oldest: trust law – the parent of
fiduciary duty law. Trust law’s “no further inquiry” rule backed
trust law’s foundational “sole interest” rule for precisely the
reasons that concern us here.206 These trust rules originated in
202. Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 271 (1950).
203. See JAMES B. STEWART, TANGLED WEBS – HOW FALSE STATEMENTS
ARE UNDERMINING AMERICA: FROM MARTHA STEWART TO BERNIE MADOFF
(2011) (exploring legal scandals featuring perjury and deception surrounding
prominent figures Martha Stewart, Lewis “Scooter” Libby, Barry Bonds and
Bernie Madoff); THOMAS O. MCGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING
SCIENCE: HOW SPECIAL INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH
(2008) (describing how self-interest has fuled wide-spread instances of
scientific deception in and out of court); Charles W. Murdock, Why Not Tell the
Truth?: Deceptive Practices and the Economic Meltdown, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L. J.
801, 801-29 (2010) (cataloging egregious instances of political, governmental,
journalistic, scientific and business corruption over the past 15 years and how
they have resulted in a crisis of truthfulness and a culture of deception).
204. Cf. Victoria Johnson, Chilling Conspiracy Alleged in Suit: State Says
Fix Was in on Price of Packaged Ice, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, March 13, 2011, at
25A (reporting lawsuit over alleged antitrust conspiracy among packaged ice
companies, including clandestine meetings and almost daily emails to discuss
prices and market allocations).
205. Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its
Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1074
(1991) (“[t]he duty of loyalty must be understood as the law’s attempt to create
an incentive structure in which the fiduciary’s self-interest directs her to act in
the best interest of the beneficiary”).
206. Judge Cardozo offered the rationale behind these rules in Wendt v.
Fischer, 154 N.E. 303, 304 (N.Y. 1926) (quoting Munson v. Syracuse, Geneva
& Corning R.R., 8 N.E. 355, 358 (N.Y. 1886) (citations omitted):
[W]e are told that the [fiduciary] acted in good faith, that the terms
procured were the best obtainable at the moment, and that the wrong, if
any, was unaccompanied by damage. This is no sufficient answer by a
trustee forgetful of his duty. The law “does not stop to inquire whether
the contract or transaction was fair or unfair. It stops the inquiry when
the relation is disclosed, and sets aside the transaction or refuses to
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part out of concern over victimized beneficiaries’ inability to prove
fraud under the English Court of Chancery’s “profoundly
defective” investigative and fact-finding system in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries made infamous in
Dickens’ Bleak House.207 Modern discovery and court procedures
are vast improvements over the old English practice, to be sure.
Yet Mullaney took 14 years to resolve,208 and Vendo was still going
strong after 17 years.209 Indeed, the Vendo litigation literally
outlived Vendo Company’s fiduciary nemesis, Harry Stoner210 – a
circumstance calling to mind the 1839 lament quoted in Professor
Langbein’s duty of loyalty article: “No man, as things now stand,
can enter into a Chancery suit with any reasonable hope of being
alive at the termination if he has a determined adversary.”211 Even
after Kerrigan established its bright-line “disclose and tender”
standard as glossed by Vendo and Mullaney, Peterson Welding
Supply still required 21 witnesses to resolve a third party refusal
to deal, and Levy still took 14 months to try this issue after years
of discovery abuse and perjury.212 Clearly, the need for fiduciary
deterrence is no less today than in Dickens’ era,213 but the ability
to determine the truth in corporate opportunity cases remains as
elusive as ever,214 especially when the third party takes center
stage, as these sad lessons from Illinois teach.
The Kerrigan “line of business” test is not a customer
protection rule; it is a principal protection rule. The Kerrigan

enforce it, at the instance of the party whom the fiduciary undertook to
represent, without undertaking to deal with the question of abstract
justice in the particular case.” Only by this uncompromising rigidity has
the rule of undivided loyalty been maintained against disintegrating
erosion.)
207. John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest
or Best Interest?, 114 YALE L. J. 929, 945 (2005). Of course, criticism of the
English Court of Chancery long pre-dated Dickens’ lament. See J.H. BAKER,
AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 111 (Oxford U. Press 4th ed.
2007) (“For two centuries before Dickens wrote Bleak House, the word
‘Chancery’ had become synonymous with expense, delay and despair.”).
208. Schaller, supra note 15, at 1035-36.
209. William Lynch Schaller, Disloyalty and Distrust: The Eroding
Fiduciary Duties of Illinois Employees, 3 DEPAUL BUS. L. J. 1, 11-12 (1991)
(recounting the Vendo litigation’s epic history).
210. Id. at 12.
211. Langbein, supra note 207, at 946, n.78.
212. Schaller, supra note 15, at 1035.
213. E.g., Veritas Capital Management, LLC v. Campbell, 918 N.Y.S.2d 448,
82 A.D.3d 529 (2011) (affirming dismissal of corporate opportunity action
against Thomas Campbell, a Veritas hedge fund minority owner and
employee, over $100 million in “outside” investments Campbell made while
still with Veritas).
214. Melanie B. Leslie, In Defense of the No Further Inquiry Rule: A
Response to Professor Langbein, 47 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 541 (2005)
(arguing that the concerns which gave rise to the “sole interest” and “no
further inquiry” rules have not diminished appreciably over time).

2013]

Policy and Practice Lessons From Illinois

55

requirements of tender and disclosure are simply not that onerous
when compared with the risk of secret activity, the difficulty of
verification after the fact, and the likelihood of induced
unwillingness to deal. When it makes its inevitable appearance,
the third party refusal to deal defense exponentially compounds
the complexity of already-complicated Illinois corporate litigation,
as reflected in the agonizing Illinois experience documented in my
second article. For these reasons, the third party refusal to deal
defense should be rejected as a matter of law and policy. To borrow
the Illinois Supreme Court’s penetrating observation in an early
fiduciary duty case: “It requires no very keen moral perception to
recognize the obvious justice of this universal rule of law, of justice
and of morality.”215

215. Dixmoor Golf Club, Inc. v. Evans, 325 Ill. 612, 616, 156 N.E.2d 785, 787
(1927).
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